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EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
MEDIATION AND MALPRACTICE
THOMAS B. METZLOFF,* RALPH A. PEEPLES,** AND CATHERINE T. HARRIS***

Mediated settlement conferences are new to North Carolina. I feel confident that this
procedure will be cost effective in the long run and I appreciate your efforts to make it
successful. Although this case did not settle, I hope that it helped you and your insured
assess the strength of your case and streamline the preparation for trial. It is also
possible that the conference will serve as a basis for settlement efforts prior to trial.
Letter from a mediator to a medical malpractice
insurer following a mediation that ended in an
impasse.

I
INTRODUCTION
Doctors have long been interested in developing alternatives to the
traditional litigation system for handling medical malpractice disputes.1 As part
of the extensive tort reform measures undertaken in response to the perceived
malpractice crisis in the early 1970s, several states enacted special
administrative mechanisms to screen malpractice disputes, while other states
passed statutes to facilitate the use of binding arbitration.2 Until fairly recently,
however, there had not been much attention paid by health care professionals
to the potential use of mediation in the malpractice context. As interest in this
form of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) has exploded in the past
decade, its potential use in resolving malpractice cases has been increasingly
suggested.3
Copyright © 1997 by Law & Contemporary Problems
* Professor of Law, Duke University.
** Professor of Law, Wake Forest University.
*** Professor of Sociology, Wake Forest University.
1. See, e.g., PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS’N AM., A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF ALTERNATIVES
TO THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF RESOLVING MEDICAL LIABILITY CLAIMS (1989); Kirk B. Johnson et al.,
A Fault-Based Administrative Alternative for Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV.
1365 (1989).
2. For an overview of the screening panel experience, see Jona Goldschmidt, Where Have all the
Panels Gone? A History of the Arizona Medical Liability Review Panel, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1013 (1992).
For a discussion of the use of binding arbitration in medical malpractice cases, see Thomas B.
Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203 (1996).
3. See Catherine S. Meschievitz, Mediation and Medical Malpractice: Problems with Definition
and Implementation, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 196 (Winter 1991). For a discussion of different
ADR methods and their application in malpractice, see Thomas B. Metzloff, Comment, Alternative
Dispute Resolution Strategies in Medical Malpractice, 9 ALASKA L. REV. 429 (1992).
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Mediation should be considered seriously. It is a less formal ADR method
than arbitration, and it offers the potential for an early intervention to resolve a
dispute without resort to trial or indeed without resort to litigation at all. In
theory, mediation can provide creative solutions to problems by identifying and
exploiting the parties’ possibly differing interests.4 Numerous reports regarding
the success of mediation-based programs in a wide variety of contexts recently
have led several states to experiment with court-ordered mediation.5
A paradox is inherent in this development. In its simplest form, disputing
parties voluntarily agree to mediate; their participation is not coerced. Further,
while a resolution may in some cases be suggested by the mediator, the parties
retain the power to accept or reject any proposed resolution of the dispute. In
contrast to conventional litigation or arbitration, an outcome cannot be
imposed on the parties. Nonetheless, when a court orders the parties to
mediation, an element of coercion has been injected; the parties are then
required to meet and explore settlement options.
In the malpractice context, the appropriateness of using mediation may be
questioned. Mediation is often thought of as being most appropriate when the
parties have an interest in maintaining a long-term relationship. For example,
regardless of any personal animosity, divorcing parents involved in a child
custody dispute have an interest in developing a workable plan for sharing
parenting responsibility. Mediation attempts to capitalize on this joint interest
by offering a process designed to identify the parties’ respective interests in the
hopes of arriving at a solution that maximizes both parties’ interests. In
contrast, the parties in a malpractice claim lack an interest in maintaining a
long-term relationship. The plaintiffs typically have suffered serious injuries
and are seeking large sums in compensation. Physicians are concerned with
their reputations, and often are unwilling to admit any liability on their part.
Any future relationship is rarely anticipated between the parties.
Nonetheless, several commentators have supported the increased use of
mediation in malpractice disputes.6 Focusing upon studies showing that anger,
confusion regarding what had happened, desire for revenge, and other
subjective factors often motivate plaintiffs to file malpractice claims,7
proponents suggest that malpractice disputes provide fertile ground for
mediation’s potential benefits as opposed to other ADR methods like
arbitration that focus on the legal merits of the dispute.8
4. For background information on the process of mediation, see generally ROBERT A. BARUCH
BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH
EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994).
5. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 44 (1995 & Supp. 1996); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
154.023 (West Supp. 1977).
6. See Meschievitz, supra note 3; Comment, Mediation and Medical Malpractice Disputes:
Potential Obstacles in the Traditional Lawyer’s Perspective, 1990 J. DISP. RESOL. 371; Comment,
Healing Angry Wounds: The Roles of Apology and Mediation in Disputes between Physicians and
Patients, 1987 MO. J. DISP. RESOL. 111.
7. See, e.g., FRANK SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1993).
8. See Edward A. Dauer & Leonard J. Marcus, Adapting Mediation to Link Resolution of
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To date, there are only anecdotal reports about the possible utility of
mediation-based ADR strategies for malpractice. This article will report on a
major empirical study conducted on the use of court-ordered mediation in the
North Carolina court system. Our analysis is based upon extensive collection
of court data, direct observation of malpractice mediations, surveys of
attorneys and mediators, and reviews of closed claim files from malpractice
insurers. Our purpose is to analyze whether this model of dispute resolution is
well-suited to malpractice cases.
Obtaining a firm understanding of the potential utility of this ADR method
is important to the ongoing debate over alternatives available for improving
how malpractice disputes are resolved. Mediation clearly has a number of
potential advantages as an ADR strategy. As operated in North Carolina and
elsewhere, court-ordered mediation is relatively inexpensive, at least from the
court’s perspective. The court’s primary involvement is to order the parties to
conduct the mediation session at their own expense. The mediator working
with the parties schedules the mediation which usually occurs at one of the
lawyer’s offices. While not a cost-free program, court-ordered mediation
places fewer demands on court administrative resources than other ADR
options such as non-binding arbitration, which is often conducted at the
public’s expense at the courthouse. If mediation can be proven effective for
malpractice claims, other courts could readily implement similar programs. For
those courts already employing mediation-based alternatives, empirically valid
information may suggest program enhancements.
Many of the issues addressed in this article apply equally to the study of any
court-related ADR program. What is the impact of this ADR form on the time
to resolution of the cases involved? How does the program affect the rate of
trial? Does it change the likelihood that a plaintiff will obtain compensation?
What does it cost? Are the litigants generally satisfied with the process?
Other questions focus more directly on issues of particular significance in
the malpractice context. Is the process of mediation well suited to the
dynamics of malpractice disputes? Should all malpractice cases be subjected to
this procedure, or is it better suited to some types of malpractice cases, such as
those in which the primary issue is the amount of damages to be paid? What
specific skills do successful mediators in malpractice cases possess? What
mediator characteristics are important to the parties? How are some of the
special attributes of malpractice litigation—such as the reporting requirement
of the National Practitioner’s Data Bank—manifested and dealt with in
malpractice mediations?
Part II explains the origins and procedures of the North Carolina mediation
program. Part III describes the methodology of the study, focusing on the
different data sources developed and the types of information collected. Part

Medical Malpractice Disputes with Health Care Quality Improvement, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
185 (Winter 1997).
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IV then describes our results, and Part V explores a number of key policy
issues relating to the use of mediation in the malpractice context.
II
THE NORTH CAROLINA MEDIATED SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE PROGRAM
In 1991, North Carolina became one of the first states in the country to
adopt an extensive program of court-ordered mediation available for use in
virtually all civil cases involving claims of $10,000 or more.9 Based largely upon
a similar program already in operation in Florida,10 the initiative permitted the
courts in each of several pilot judicial districts to require the parties in any civil
case to attend a “mediated settlement conference” (“MSC”) conducted by a
certified mediator. The program potentially applied to all superior court civil
cases which, in North Carolina, included virtually all medical malpractice
cases.11 The purpose of the MSC program was to “determine whether a system
of mediated settlement conferences may make the operation of the superior
courts more efficient, less costly, and more satisfying to the litigants.”12
As had been done with previous ADR efforts in North Carolina, the
program was initiated on a pilot basis in a limited number of judicial districts.13
The original group of pilot judicial districts included eight districts comprising
thirteen of the state’s 100 counties. Based upon initial anecdotal reports of the
program’s success, the pilot phase was expanded as of July 1, 1994 to include
four other judicial districts, including three large urban counties covering the
cities of Charlotte, Raleigh, and Asheville. Based upon both anecdotal and
empirical studies supporting the program, the North Carolina General
Assembly authorized all judicial districts to utilize the MSC program as of
January 1, 1996.14
Under both the statute and implementing rules, each judicial district
9. For general background on the North Carolina program, see Comment, Good Faith Mediation:
Improving Efficiency, Cost, and Satisfaction in North Carolina’s Pre-trial Process, 18 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 281 (1996); Comment, An End to Settlement on the Courthouse Steps? Mediated Settlement
Conference in North Carolina Superior Courts, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1857 (1993).
10. See FLA. STAT. ch. 44 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
11. Jurisdiction in civil matters is divided in North Carolina between the Superior Court and the
District Courts. Generally speaking, the North Carolina District Courts have jurisdiction over claims
involving up to $10,000 as the amount in controversy. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-243 (1995). Courtbased mediation was not applied to the District Courts because the state has long utilized an extensive
court-ordered arbitration program in many judicial districts that applies predominately to the smaller
stakes disputes found in the District Courts. For information on the North Carolina court-ordered
arbitration program and its impact, see STEVENS H. CLARKE ET AL., COURT-ORDERED
ARBITRATION IN NORTH CAROLINA: AN EVALUATION OF ITS EFFECTS (1989); George K. Walker,
Court-Ordered Arbitration Comes to North Carolina and the Nation, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 901
(1986).
12. 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 207 (codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38 (1995)).
13. See id. A similar approach was taken with respect to the court-ordered arbitration program in
North Carolina. See CLARKE, supra note 11.
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1(d) (1995). The empirical research was undertaken by Stevens H.
Clarke at the Institute for Government at the University of North Carolina. See STEVENS H. CLARKE,
ET AL., COURT-ORDERED CIVIL CASE MEDIATION IN NORTH CAROLINA: AN EVALUATION OF ITS
EFFECTS (1996).
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maintained significant discretion respecting the operation of the MSC program.
The primary choice was whether to order any or all cases to mediation. Each
judicial district retained the option to be selective and to send only some cases
to mediation; alternatively, a district could send all of its cases without making
any determination that each case was suitable or that the parties desired to
participate.15 In fact, the large majority of districts involved in the program
routinely ordered all civil cases, including malpractice cases, to mediation.
Each district maintained the authority to act upon the parties’ motion to
exempt cases from mediation. Each judicial district also maintained significant
discretion as to when to order a case to mediation. The following are key
features of the MSC program.
A. Qualification of Mediators
The mediator is required to be a neutral person who acts “to encourage and
facilitate a resolution” of the matter.16 The program anticipated that cases
would usually be handled by a mediator who was certified by the State. In
order to be certified, a person has to meet certain minimum eligibility
requirements. Although certification for the MSC program initially was
limited to experienced North Carolina lawyers, in 1994 the rules were amended
to permit non-attorney mediators to be certified.17 In addition, an applicant has
to complete a forty-hour training course relating to the mediation process.18
The training courses are conducted by private entities whose course of
instruction is approved by the state’s Administrative Office of the Courts.
Other than having to observe two MSCs prior to certification, mediators are
not required to have any particular level of experience in facilitating mediation
sessions. No efforts are made to create areas of specialization among
mediators; any certified mediator is available to be appointed to mediate any
type of case. Interest in being certified as a mediator under the program has
been high; there has never been a shortage of available mediators. Currently,
more than 660 attorneys are certified as mediators.19 Additional training
sessions are regularly offered and the list of certified mediators has continued
to expand.

15. See N.C. R. IMPLEMENTING MEDIATED SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES IN SUPER. CT. ACTIONS
Rule 1.
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38 (1995).
17. In order to be certified, a non-attorney has to have extensive experience in mediation as well
as have completed the same training course required of attorneys. In addition, non-attorneys are
required to take a short course dealing with basic court procedures. As a practical matter, very few
non-attorney mediators have been selected by parties or appointed by courts; none of the mediators in
the cases that we studied were non-attorney mediators.
18. N.C. R. IMPLEMENTING MEDIATED SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES IN SUPER. CT. ACTIONS
Rule 9.
19. See NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, THE REPORT OF THE
NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMMITTEE ON THE MEDIATED
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES PILOT PROGRAM (1995); REPORT OF THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
COMMISSION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996-97, at 2.
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B. Selection of Mediators
The initial set of rules provided that the court would make a preliminary
appointment of a mediator at the same time that the case was ordered to
mediation.20 The parties had the right to override the selection by agreeing on
another mediator. In order to encourage the parties to select their own
mediator, this procedure was subsequently modified. Under the modified
procedure, at the time the case is sent to mediation, the parties are given
twenty-one days to agree upon their own mediator.21 If no one is selected, the
court then appoints a certified mediator. The parties are given significant
leeway in terms of their selection. They are not limited to certified mediators;
virtually anyone can serve as a mediator if jointly agreed upon by the parties.22
The courts provide some information about the available mediators, but, in
general, the drafters of the program place significant reliance on the free
market to operate effectively. Mediators regularly advertise, and if they are
privately appointed, they may charge whatever rate the parties agree upon; fees
for court-appointed mediators are capped at $100 per hour (plus an additional
$100 for travel and preparation). In cases in which they are selected by the
parties, most mediators currently charge between $100 and $175 per hour.
C. Timing of the Mediation
The rules do not prescribe a preferred timetable for when the MSC should
be held. When cases are ordered to mediation varies somewhat from district to
district as each court attempts to integrate mediation into ongoing case
management programs. If it chooses, a district could order a case to mediation
before expert witnesses are deposed or even designated by the parties.
Another district might elect to order mediation only on the eve of trial after the
completion of discovery.
D. Attendance Requirements
Under the mediation program, all parties and their attorneys are required
to attend.23 In addition, in contexts such as malpractice where insurance
policies are commonly involved, the rules initially required the attendance of a
representative of the doctor’s insurance carrier with “full authority to settle the
claim.”24 Given the ambiguity of the term “full authority to settle,” the
20. See N.C. R. IMPLEMENTING MEDIATED SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES IN SUPER. CT. ACTIONS
Rule 1.
21. See id. Rule 3.
22. See id. Almost all of the mediators identified in our study were certified mediators. One
exception was a retired state court judge who had been active in arbitrating and mediating civil cases.
With his reputation well established, he did not feel the need to complete the training requirement.
He relied on party selection rather than court appointments.
23. Similar attendance requirements are common in court-ordered ADR, even if controversial.
See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
24. N.C. R. IMPLEMENTING MEDIATED SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES IN SUPER. CT. ACTIONS
Rule 4 (1991) (amended 1995).
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requirement was recently modified. Sanctions were authorized for failure of a
party to attend, but beyond attendance there is no explicit requirement of any
“good faith” participation.25 The purpose of the attendance requirements is to
ensure that those with both personal and financial stakes in the case are
physically present to hear the other side’s presentation and to react to the
mediator’s questions and comments. Initially, the mediator was not given the
authority to excuse physical attendance of the required parties; the court itself
retained that authority. The rules were recently relaxed to permit the
mediator, with the consent of the parties, to excuse the presence of any of the
parties or the insurance representative.26
E. Conduct of the Session
Unlike trials or other more formal ADR methods, the expectations about
how the mediation session is to proceed are not explicitly set forth in the rules.
The rules simply provide that the mediator is “in control” of the conference.27
The mediator is authorized to work with the parties to structure the session.
Typically, an opening joint session in which all parties are present is followed
by a series of private caucuses in which the mediator meets with just one side
or, occasionally, with just the party or the attorney. In fact, the only required
element to the mediation process is the initial recitation by the mediator
concerning the process of the mediation, the applicable confidentiality
provisions, and the handling of the mediator’s fee.28 The MSC continues until
such time as an agreement is reached, the session is adjourned to a later date,
or the mediator declares an impasse. There is no minimum or maximum length
established in the rules.
III
METHODOLOGY
Our research was based upon four primary sources of data, each of which is
described below. In combination, these sources provide a rich supply of
information upon which to draw both to assess objectively how the courtordered mediation process works as well as to describe with confidence its
subjective dynamics.
A. Court Data
We attempted to collect data from court records in all malpractice cases
ordered to mediation pursuant to the North Carolina MSC program from the
beginning of the program in early 1992 through cases filed by December 31,
1995. This cut-off date served both to maximize the number of cases in our
25.
26.
27.
28.

See id. Rule 5.
See id. Rule 4.
Id. Rule 6.
See id. Rules 6, 7.
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sample, as well as to avoid any confounding impact caused by the statewide
expansion of the MSC program as of January 1, 1996. All counties involved in
the pilot program (including the four additional judicial districts that were
added to the pilot program as of July 1, 1994) were included.29
Identification of cases created an initial obstacle. The state does not
separately code malpractice cases in such a way as to permit ready
identification. Fortunately, many of the individual districts separately tracked
malpractice cases. Through the cooperation of the court’s administrative
personnel, we were able to obtain complete listings of malpractice cases in
several of the larger counties. These listings facilitated our court data
collection efforts as well as our efforts to observe a significant number of
mediations. Given the lack of a state-wide comprehensive list, we are unable to
state with certainty that all malpractice cases were in fact located. Efforts were
made to identify additional cases through review of insurer records. This
review largely confirmed the accuracy of our court-based identification.
With respect to mediation, all judicial districts that we studied with one
exception routinely filed all orders and reports relating to the mediation.30
Most court files contained the initial order to mediation, the form appointing
the mediator, requests for extensions of the mediation deadline or exemption
from the process, and the subsequent report of the mediator indicating the
result of the mediation. The mediator’s report also contained information on
the location of the mediation, the length of time of the mediation, and the
amount charged by the mediator, although in some cases, mediators did not
provide all the information requested on the form. This information permitted
us to collect data regarding when the case was ordered to mediation, whether
the parties selected or the court appointed the mediator, the date of the
mediation, the cost paid by the parties to the mediator, the number of persons
attending the mediation, the length of the session, and the result of the
mediation. Court files also permitted us to collect data on other important
procedural events such as the filing of discovery motions, discovery schedules,
motions for summary judgment, and trial results (if any).31 To date, we have
collected court data on a total of 318 cases that were ordered to mediation, an
estimated eighty-five percent of all malpractice cases ordered to mediation
during the period of time covered.32
29. The counties involved from the outset of the program (with the name of any major city
included in parentheses) were Bladen, Brunswick, Chatham, Columbus, Cumberland (Fayetteville),
Forsyth (Winston-Salem), Guilford (Greensboro), Halifax, Haywood, Jackson, Orange (Chapel Hill),
Stokes, and Surry. The four counties which were added to the pilot program as of July 1, 1994 were
Buncombe (Asheville), Mecklenburg (Charlotte), Wake (Raleigh), and Wayne.
30. In Cumberland County, the mediation orders and reports were not filed. Nonetheless, we
identified nine cases through other means in which we were able to collect the necessary data and
therefore included them in the study. Other cases were not included as a result of our inability to
determine from court records whether a mediation was ordered or the result of the mediation.
31. A similar methodology was used in a prior study of North Carolina malpractice cases. See
Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury’s Shadow, 54 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 (Winter 1991).
32. This estimate is based upon information from a prior study of malpractice cases during the late
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B. Direct Observations of Malpractice Mediations
While review of court files was sufficient to obtain objective information
relating to several aspects of the mediation program, it did not provide any
insight into the dynamics of the mediation process. Mediators are not required
to submit a narrative detailing the issues raised in the mediation or the
strategies used to attempt to overcome obstacles to settlement. In order to
better understand these dynamics, we observed a significant number of
malpractice mediations. Determining when the MSC sessions were being held
was not a simple task. While the courts ordered the parties to conduct the
mediation, the court did not schedule the date of the mediation. Accordingly,
after obtaining the names of cases ordered to mediation either from the courts
or from malpractice insurers or other attorneys, we called the attorneys, claims
adjuster, or the mediator involved in the case to determine the date and request
permission to attend.33 In only one case were we refused permission to attend.
To date, we have observed a total of forty-two mediations, one of the
largest number of actual observations in any study of court-ordered
mediation.34 Attending a mediation was usually a day-long commitment given
that they typically last at least four hours and are held throughout the state. In
each observation, the observer followed the mediator, attending both the joint
sessions and the private caucuses taking notes on what transpired. The
observer was permitted to attend all parts of the mediation in all but one case.
After attending the mediation, each observer wrote a lengthy narrative
description of the mediation and coded a detailed form relating to key issues,
including whether certain topics were discussed, what techniques were used,
and the level of the parties’ participation.
C. Insurance Reviews
In order to obtain a better understanding of how the participants viewed
the mediation process, we also attempted to review closed claims files from

1980s. See id.
33. As a result of the methods by which we had to identify possible observations, the cases we
observed were not a random sample of the cases actually mediated. We did over-sample, for example,
mediations conducted by one malpractice insurer who routinely sent us information on upcoming
mediations. Nonetheless, we obtained a wide range of exposure to different mediators attending
mediation sessions throughout the state. We observed twenty different mediators, including all of the
mediators in the study who mediated five or more malpractice cases. We observed mediations from
eleven of the seventeen counties involved in the program. The settlement rate in the cases we
observed was comparable to the overall population. Accordingly, we are not aware of any bias
resulting from the subset of observed cases.
34. In addition, we observed six other cases that were voluntarily mediated (as opposed to courtordered) from counties not authorized to mandate mediation. The primary purpose of observing these
mediations was to familiarize ourselves with any possible differences that might occur. We have not
included these voluntary mediations in our data set because of the possibility that such cases involved
different dynamics, such as the willingness of both sides to explore settlement. In fact, all but one of
the voluntary mediations we observed resulted in an agreement at the mediation, a much higher
percentage than observed in the larger universe of court-ordered mediations.
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insurers and health care providers who were responsible for defending
malpractice claims.
Insurer files are a particularly reliable source of
information. Malpractice insurers have a contractual responsibility to defend
such cases and, as repeat players in the process, it is in their best interest to
gather all relevant information and make an objective assessment of its
significance. Under the MSC rules, an insurance representative “with
authority” was required to be present. As a result, the insurance files provided
a detailed accounting of how the insurers prepared for the mediation sessions
and provided insights on the impact of the sessions on the subsequent
resolution of the case. The files thus provide information on the critical
question whether a settlement subsequent to the mediation was in fact the
direct result of the mediation or a function of independent developments in the
case.
By reviewing the insurance file, we also were able to confirm objective
information relating to the resolution of the case. For example, court files
often are resolved either by a dismissal with prejudice or a dismissal without
prejudice. A dismissal with prejudice precludes the plaintiff from refiling the
claim. A dismissal without prejudice leaves open the possibility that the claim
will be refiled within twelve months.35 To some extent, the former dispositions
are ambiguous. Usually, if the plaintiff is paid money in settlement, the
defendant will insist upon the filing of a dismissal with prejudice. Nonetheless,
not all dismissals with prejudice indicate cases in which a settlement was paid.
On occasion, a plaintiff will agree to a dismissal with prejudice in return for the
defendant’s agreement not to seek sanctions or court costs. It is vitally
important to distinguish between cases in which plaintiffs received payments
and cases that were dropped without payment. Insurance reviews provide
definitive information on whether there was in fact a settlement and also
permit a determination of the amount paid in settlement. To date, we have
been able to review files in forty-seven cases that were actually mediated.
These do not represent a random sample, as not all insurers permitted access,
nor do some insurers maintain sufficient records to provide valuable
information.
D. Surveys
In order to assess several pertinent issues, surveys were prepared and sent
to the participants in the mediations. The primary surveys reported on in this
article were sent to the attorneys and mediators who had participated in one or
more malpractice mediations.
Both of these surveys focused on the
participant’s views on a number of key issues, such as whether courts should
routinely refer all malpractice cases to mediation.
Our response rate was quite high. Of 103 defense lawyers surveyed, a total
of seventy-two responded (seventy percent). Of 145 plaintiffs’ lawyers
surveyed, a total of forty-five responded (thirty-one percent). Our return rate
35. See N.C. R. CIV. P. 41(a).
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among “repeat” players—attorneys who had been involved in five or more
mediations—was higher; we obtained responses from at least one of the
attorneys in more than eighty-five percent of cases that actually went to
mediation. We also surveyed all seventy-eight mediators who had conducted
any malpractice mediations, and have received thirty-two responses to date
(forty percent). Our response rate among the more experienced mediators was
again higher, in part because we conducted telephone follow-up interviews with
those mediators who were more active in the malpractice field.
IV
ASSESSING THE MEDIATION PROCESS
Before commenting on our results, it is useful to provide a short description
of what ideally a system of court-ordered mediation could accomplish. During
the discussions on the merits of establishing such a program, supporters of
court-ordered mediation often made a variety of claims about how the process
might work. The central claim was that court-ordered mediation could resolve
a high percentage of cases either at the MSC itself or in the period immediately
following the session as the parties continued fruitful discussions begun at the
session. While no particular percentage was established as a benchmark,
anecdotal reports of settlement rates generally for all types of cases
approaching eighty percent or higher were reported as obtainable based upon
experiences in Florida. Mediation sessions could be conducted earlier in the
litigation, potentially offering the parties significant cost savings over
traditional settlements at the courthouse steps. MSCs were also touted as a
way to involve the parties directly in the decisionmaking process as the
mediators explored nonmonetary solutions in the creative environment of
mediation. From the court’s vantage point, mediation promised the early
resolution of a large percentage of cases so that attention could be better spent
on those truly intractable cases that could not be resolved at mediation. At
least in the malpractice context, were these potential benefits realized?
How does a typical court-ordered mediation proceed in a malpractice case?
The following description of typical formats and patterns of malpractice
mediations is based primarily upon our direct observation of forty-two
mediations, together with descriptive information gained from our review of
court records in 202 malpractice cases in which mediations were held.
A. Number and Length of Sessions
As noted above, the rules do not prescribe the location, length, or number
of sessions to be held. One possibility would be that in complex cases such as
malpractice, multiple sessions would be expected because the parties would
grapple with a series of issues and then adjourn to obtain additional facts or to
reflect upon the arguments made by the opposition. This dynamic did not
occur regularly. With few exceptions, court-ordered mediations were one-shot
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affairs: ninety-four percent of the mediations involved a single session. The
parties conducted more than one session in only eight of 143 mediated cases in
which the information is available (six percent). More than two sessions were
held in only one case. Whatever magic could be accomplished in the mediation
had to be worked at the initial session.
One reason why multiple sessions were not more frequent was the difficulty
involved in convening the required parties.
On average, malpractice
mediations involved a total of seven different participants. The largest
mediation in our study involved twenty-three participants.
Numerous
mediators and attorneys remarked to us how difficult it was to schedule the
mediations; the thought of reconvening was, absent compelling reasons, no
doubt daunting. A more basic reason might be the fact that the parties met
with one another in the first place only because they were ordered to do so.
For all practical purposes, once the required session was held, the parties had
little motivation to go to the trouble of scheduling an additional session. This is
not to say that the negotiations necessarily ended; rather, the norm was for
follow-up discussions, if any, to occur without reconvening the mediation.
The length of the sessions varied significantly. As set forth in Table 1
below, sessions ran from a few minutes to all day affairs. Based upon 162
mediated cases in which information on length was available, the average
length was 3.7 hours; the median length was 3.3 hours, indicating a large
number of relatively brief sessions. Successful mediations typically took longer
than average as the parties worked toward resolution. Indeed, the length of the
session was largely determined by the defendant’s willingness to continue the
session by discussing further existing settlement offers. Another factor
influencing the length of the session was the number of parties involved. In
more complex, multi-party disputes (for example, a dispute involving both a
private physician and a hospital), the mediations were longer, reflecting the
obvious need for each party to describe the issues relevant to them and the
need for more complex “shuttle diplomacy” as the mediator moved between
the parties.
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TABLE 1
LENGTH OF MEDIATIONS IN MALPRACTICE CASES
(N = 162)
Total Mediation Time

# Of Cases

Percent

0.5 Hours To 1 Hour

9

5.6%

1.1 Hours To 2 Hours

26

16.0%

More Than 2 Hours To 3 Hours

44

27.2%

More Than 3 Hours To 4 Hours

31

19.1%

More Than 4 Hours To 5 Hours

21

13.0%

More Than 5 Hours To 6 Hours

13

8.0%

More Than 6 Hours To 7 Hours

9

5.6%

More Than 7 Hours

9

5.6%

MEAN LENGTH: 3.7 HOURS
MEDIAN LENGTH: 3.3 HOURS
NOTE: Time is expressed to the nearest .1 hour. If multiple mediations were held, the total time
involved in all mediations is reported. Only cases for which the information on length of the mediation
is known are included.

Mediator style also affected the session’s length. Some mediators are more
willing to declare an impasse than others whose style is to continue to seek
progress toward settlement even if in rather small steps. Many of the shorter
sessions were cases in which the defendants were adamant about not offering a
settlement, the mediator accepted the position, and quickly declared an
impasse.
B. The Structure of the Mediation Session
Unlike trials or more formal ADR methods, the expectations of what
issues are to be presented in a mediation are not explicitly set forth in the rules.
The mediator is authorized to structure the session as he or she deems best,
typically combining joint sessions with private caucuses.
Despite the potential for creative structuring, however, mediations tend to
follow a rather set pattern. The opening session typically begins with the
mediator giving the parties a pep talk of sorts. During this opening soliloquy,
the mediator often invokes the perceived power of mediation, urging the
parties to listen carefully to one another. The parties are often told that this
session constitutes their “best chance to settle” the matter without enduring the
rigors of trial. Plaintiff’s counsel speaks next making an opening statement.
After the defense responds, the mediation then breaks into a series of private
caucuses where the mediator meets separately with the different parties and
their attorneys, again usually beginning with the plaintiff. It is often the case
that the parties then remain separated for the remainder of the session.
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The length of the opening session depends primarily on how the plaintiff’s
attorney chooses to approach the mediation. Some opening sessions are quite
short as the parties prefer to move almost immediately into the private
sessions. Other plaintiffs’ attorneys treat the opening session in a fashion
similar to that of an opening statement at trial. They use the opportunity to
present a detailed overview of their case, sometimes complete with exhibits or
summaries of the alleged negligence of the physician. This difference in
approach is reflected in the wide variation in time spent in the initial opening
statement. Observed times ranged from a few cases with an opening session of
only fifteen minutes, to several cases in which the opening session exceeded
two hours. Even the most lengthy of openings seldom provided the parties
with new information. Rather, the purpose of lengthy openings was either to
educate the mediator about the merits of the case or to demonstrate to the
opposing party the ability of the attorney to present the salient facts.
Following the opening statement, the parties typically break into private
sessions during which the mediator shuttles back and forth between the groups
of parties. The typical pattern is simply to have the mediator go back and forth
between the opposing parties. In cases with multiple defendants represented
by different attorneys, typically each defendant group is treated separately. On
occasion, where there are common interests between the defendant groups, the
mediator meets with the defendants jointly.
One of the potential benefits of mediation is the opportunity for the
mediator to work directly with the parties to explore settlement options. One
way to accomplish this goal would be for the mediator to meet with the parties
in the absence of their attorneys. In fact, this dynamic rarely occurred, perhaps
because the mediators were themselves attorneys and uncomfortable with
communicating with a party without his or her counsel present. A mediator
met with the parties without their attorneys present in only one of the forty-two
observed cases. Instead of creating a situation in which the parties could
directly confront each other, the mediators almost unanimously opted for
separate meetings in order, apparently, to maintain greater control over the
exchange of information, ideas, and emotions.
Separate meetings were more common between the mediator and the
lawyers involved. In slightly more than one-third of the observed sessions, the
mediator had a separate meeting with the plaintiff’s attorney without the
plaintiff present. Often the purpose of a lawyer-only conversation was to
discuss specific problems that the lawyer was having with his or her client (such
as where the plaintiff might not agree with the attorney’s analysis of what
figure would constitute a fair settlement), or to discuss a particular problem
relating to the client (such as possible contributory negligence or issues relating
to damages such as the plaintiff’s life expectancy that were perceived as
difficult to discuss in the plaintiff’s presence). Mediators met less frequently
with just the defendant’s attorneys; in only nineteen percent of the observed
cases was this dynamic noted. The purpose here was usually to see if the
defense attorney believed it would be possible to obtain additional settlement
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funds from the insurance company or else to discuss possible allocation
questions among different defendants. In sixteen percent of the cases, the
mediator had a separate meeting with all the attorneys without any clients or
insurers present. This typically happened toward the end of the litigation to
discuss a particular problem relating to one of the parties or to clarify plans for
future negotiations.
C. Mediator Style
What does the mediator do to pursue settlement? This is to some extent a
matter of style. While a full exploration of the mediator approaches to
common problems is beyond the scope of this article, several general patterns
emerged. A few mediators assumed a commanding presence in the mediation,
offering opinions about how a party’s case would likely be received by a jury
should the matter be tried. Other mediators avoided any direct comment on
the merits, but were still directly involved with the parties in analyzing the
merits of the case or formulating offers. Fully half of the mediators we
observed at some point in the session expressed a specific opinion about the
amount of a party’s offer or how the offer should be presented. This assertive
mediator personality occasionally went so far as the mediator offering an
opinion as to what a fair settlement value should be. In twelve percent of the
cases we observed, the mediator offered an opinion about the merits of the
case. Such assertive behavior typically did not occur until the lawyers
themselves had discussed the value of the case at some length. In fact,
attorneys on occasion asked the mediator to provide an evaluation. In one
case, the defense counsel repeatedly asked the mediator to opine as to a “fair
settlement” in the case based upon his past experience in malpractice cases.
The offering of such an opinion is problematic; the mediation process is
premised in large part upon the mediator working with both parties to explore
the strengths and weaknesses of the case. Indeed, a recently enacted ethics
code for mediators strictly prohibits them from expressing an opinion on the
merits of a case.36
More commonly, however, the mediators adopted a more passive,
exploratory role in the mediation. Indeed, in some cases in which the parties
are clearly intent on settling, the mediator’s role is entirely passive and consists
of simply shuttling the respective offers and demands between the parties. The
specific approach taken by mediators is a function of a number of variables
36. See STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ADOPTED BY N.C. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
COMM’N. This rule is more restrictive than the corresponding ethics rule in Florida, which prohibits a
mediator from offering a personal or professional opinion “as to how the court in which the case has
been filed will resolve the dispute.” FLA. R. CERT. & CT-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.070; see Robert B.
Moberly, Ethical Standards for Court-Appointed Mediators and Florida’s Mandatory Mediation
Experiment, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 701 (1994). For further discussion of the mediator’s ethical duties
relating to offering evaluations on the merits of the case, see James J. Alfini, Evaluative Versus
Facilitative Mediation: A Discussion, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 919, 921-26 (1997); Robert B. Moberly,
Mediator Gag Rules: Is it Ethical for Mediators to Evaluate or Advise?, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 669 (1997).
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including the issues in dispute, the parties’ approach to the dispute, the
mediator’s style, and specific factual issues raised in the case. Nonetheless,
mediators commonly use several techniques. Table 2 lists these techniques and
how frequently we observed them.
TABLE 2
TECHNIQUES COMMONLY USED BY MEDIATORS IN MALPRACTICE CASES
(N = 40)
Technique Used By Mediator

# Of Cases

Percent

Explored Risk Of Litigation With Plaintiff

18

45%

Explained Strength Of Other Side’s Case

17

43%

Explored Likely Jury Verdicts

16

40%

Discussed How A Jury Might Respond To Facts

14

35%

Explored Risk Of Litigation With Defendant

13

33%

Advised Party How To Present/Structure Offer/Demand

11

28%

Explored “Worst Case Scenario”

8

20%

Educated Party About Associated Legal Requirements

7

18%

Discussed Likely Emotional Impact Of Trial

6

15%

Discussed Expense Of Litigation With Plaintiff

3

8%

Discussed Expense Of Litigation With Defendant

3

8%

Discussed Potential Of Adverse Publicity

2

5%

Discussed Loss Of Income Associated With Trial

2

5%

Discussed Possibility Of Delay (Appeals, Etc.)

1

3%

Mediators most often explored likely jury verdicts with both parties. It was
a common litany at some point early in the respective private sessions for a
mediator to ask a question such as “If this case were tried ten times, what
would happen?” A similar technique, couched in terms designed to highlight
the risks of litigation, was to ask the parties to identify their “worst case
scenario.” These types of questions provided an easy entree for the mediator
to describe (or at times overstate) the inherent uncertainty associated with jury
trials. The risk of trial was especially emphasized with the plaintiffs; mediators
often discussed the vagaries of the jury process and the difficulty malpractice
plaintiffs have in prevailing, sometimes even with good claims. Similar
discussions were held with defendants, but with less frequency. This disparity
may well be a function of the mediator’s perception that there was a greater
need to deflate the opinions of the plaintiff than to raise the fears of the
defendant physicians. In part, this perception is supported by the fact that
virtually all malpractice defendants are represented by attorneys with extensive
experience in malpractice litigation. Plaintiffs are far more often represented
by attorneys with limited medical malpractice experience.
The list of mediator techniques indicates the difficulties that mediators
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often have in developing a strategy for promoting settlement with physicians.
While some mediators attempted to discuss the costs of litigation with
defendants, in fact, this was an unproductive tactic; physician litigation
expenses are covered by malpractice insurance. Some mediators attempted to
point out the adverse publicity associated with a trial or discuss the loss of
income, but as noted in Table 2 these were not common tactics. The mediator
function of “educating a party” was usually directed at plaintiffs, perhaps
because the mediator believed that the defense counsel and insurer had already
realistically informed the physician of likely outcomes. The mediator’s focus
on plaintiffs may also reflect the fact that the decision concerning how much
money the doctor would pay in settlement (as opposed to whether to offer any
money in the first place) rested with the insurer, not the physician. Mediators
seemed to have little to directly discuss with insurers who are experienced
repeat players.37
D. Involvement of Parties
A critically important issue is the extent to which the parties themselves
are involved in the mediation process. One of the promised benefits of a
mediation-based approach is the opportunity for the parties to participate
directly and raise concerns of personal importance regardless of their legal
significance.
1. Involvement of Plaintiffs. The plaintiffs (or a representative such as a
parent in cases in which the injured party was unable to attend due to the
seriousness of the alleged injury) were routinely present in the mediations.
Indeed, in all cases we observed, the plaintiff was present. In cases in which the
patient had died or was severely injured, the plaintiff is often the patient’s
parent. Presence, however, did not equate with active participation. Indeed,
few plaintiffs were involved at all during the opening joint sessions, which were
conducted almost exclusively by the attorneys. In only one of the forty-two
cases that we observed did the plaintiff substantially participate in the joint
session.
Plaintiffs were more regularly involved during the private sessions, although
perhaps not to the extent that one might expect in a mediation-based process.
In about one-third of the cases observed, the plaintiffs had substantial
involvement in the private sessions. In another fifty percent of the cases, they
had minor involvement (such as responding to a question by the mediator or
raising one or two concerns), while in about fifteen percent, the plaintiffs did
not participate at all even in the private sessions.
How significant was the involvement by plaintiffs in the observed
mediations? Ultimately, this is not an easily answered question. Simply on the
37. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (discussing the concept of “repeat players” in litigation).
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basis of direct participation, plaintiff involvement was limited and probably less
extensive than predicted by supporters of the program. Based upon our
observations, in only about one in seven mediations was the plaintiff directly
and substantially involved in extensive “venting” activities such as directly
expressing anger at the health care providers. But one cannot dismiss the
potential benefits to the plaintiff personally from other events occurring during
the mediation. Even for plaintiffs who do not participate verbally, there is a
potentially valuable educational function associated with mediation. Plaintiffs
are present and listening to the presentations of the defendants without having
the information filtered by their attorney. They also can listen to the types of
questions and concerns raised by the mediator during the joint as well as
private sessions. Also, there is ample time to discuss the case privately with
their own attorney while the mediator is meeting with the defendant and their
representatives. As we were not privy to such private discussions, we are not
aware of what typically occurs, but it is clear that there is the possibility for
significant and valuable discussions with plaintiffs and their own counsel.38
Also, in the joint sessions, considerable “vicarious” venting of plaintiff
emotions is possible in presentations made by the plaintiff’s attorney. Some
plaintiffs may be more comfortable with listening as their attorney describes
the seriousness of their injuries or the alleged incompetence of the physicians
who treated them. We certainly observed cases in which the plaintiff’s
attorneys, especially during private sessions, spoke at great length about the
difficulties the plaintiff was experiencing or expressed the plaintiff’s anger as to
how they were treated. It is, of course, not possible to determine whether a
lawyer’s description is a function of a plaintiff’s felt need to express particular
concerns or the lawyer’s own sense of how best to present the case.
2. Involvement of Defendant Doctors. Our results with respect to the
involvement of doctors in the mediation sessions revealed a number of
interesting differences. The most significant difference is that the defendant
physician was sometimes not even present at the mediation, despite the fact
that the rules clearly anticipated and arguably required the presence of all
parties. Physicians were not present in eight of the thirty-six MSCs that we
observed in which a physician was named as a defendant.39 The absence of the
defendant was not impermissible per se, as the rules permit absence if agreed
to by the attorneys for all parties with the concurrence of the mediator.40 We
are aware of at least ten other cases in addition to the cases we observed in
which the court records report the physician as absent. Because mediators only
infrequently completed the part of the form that notes absences, we cannot
38. We intend as one of the next steps in this research to interview individual plaintiffs or plaintiff
representatives (such as parents) who attended the mediations.
39. In four cases, there was no physician defendant as the claim was solely against a hospital. In
two other cases, the physician defendant had died.
40. See N.C.R. IMPLEMENTING MEDIATED SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES IN SUPER. CT. ACTIONS
Rule 4.
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report a firm percentage of physician absence with confidence nor detail any
trend in attendance patterns. It is clear, however, that physicians were absent
with some degree of frequency.
The reasons given for the doctor’s absence vary. Sometimes, it was simply a
question of physical proximity; the doctor, perhaps an intern at the time of the
alleged malpractice, has moved to another state and it did not seem worth the
trouble to travel back to North Carolina for the conference. Other stated
reasons included the doctor’s busy schedule or travel plans. In other cases, the
absence resulted from a judgment call by the insurer and defense attorney that
the presence of the doctor would be counter-productive, where, for example,
the doctor was sufficiently angry about the suit that it would not be conducive
to promoting settlement to have the doctor present or that the plaintiff bore
such ill will toward the physician as to make the doctor’s presence an obstacle
to resolution. Absence of a party to some extent limits the mediator’s ability to
conduct the MSC.
In the cases in which the physician was present, the physicians’ level of
involvement varied. As a general matter, doctors were less directly involved in
the mediation than were plaintiffs. During the joint sessions, physicians, like
the plaintiffs themselves, were largely passive. Of twenty-eight observed cases
in which a defendant physician was present, in fourteen the doctor did not
participate at all in the joint session. Of those that did participate, only three
participated substantially in the joint session.
In the private sessions, the physicians were predictably more active. In
seven of twenty-two cases, they participated substantially. In some of these
cases, such participation involved the physician explaining why he or she was
not negligent, or discussing items such as the impact of the reporting
requirement relating to the National Practitioner’s Data Bank on their
willingness to settle. In another twelve cases, the physicians participated, but
only to a minor extent. In the remaining three cases, the physicians did not
participate at all in the private sessions.
E. Mediator Preparation
An interesting issue is the extent to which mediators prepare for the
sessions. Given the often complex factual background involved in such cases,
one might expect that parties would routinely want the mediators to spend a
few hours familiarizing themselves with the basic facts and allegations in the
case. An opposing view is that since the mediator is not being called upon to
make a decision or express an opinion on the merits, such preparation would
not be productive. We found that only in a few cases did the parties provide
the mediator with memoranda summarizing the facts of the case or key
documents in advance of the session. In more than eighty-five percent of the
observed cases in which we were able to ascertain if such materials were sent,
the mediators performed no advance preparation. Indeed, some mediators we
observed made a special point of remarking that they intentionally did not want
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any advance information, instead preferring that each side make an initial
presentation to explain their position for the benefit of both the mediator and
the opposing party. This fact is striking in that, without such preparation, the
mediator’s ability to comment directly on the merits of the case—even to the
extent of pointing out possible strengths or weaknesses without expressing an
opinion directly on the merits—is limited. The working assumption of most
mediators is that their specific knowledge about the facts of the case and its
merits is not relevant to the task at hand. This may reflect the fact that few
mediators have any substantive medical training.41
F. Cost Information
Any assessment of the merits of the mediation process requires some
measure of its cost. Proponents of the program praise its cost effectiveness.
Certainly, from the court’s perspective, the MSC program is relatively
inexpensive, consisting primarily of the administrative costs associated with
sending out the various notices and tracking results. But what is a fair measure
of the entire cost to the parties?
The most obvious direct expense is the parties’ payment to the mediator.
This is largely a function of the length of the mediation, since most mediators
charge an hourly rate for conducting the mediations. Based upon the mediator
reports filed with the courts in the cases we analyzed, the average payment to
the mediator was $520 per case, which is approximately $100 per hour times the
average length of the mediation plus a $100 preparation charge (to cover travel
time and preparation charges) as permitted by the rules. The average amount
has been increasing marginally over the years, which primarily reflects the fact
that mediators selected by the parties can establish their own rates, and the
rates for the mediators most in demand (who are often asked to mediate
malpractice disputes) has been increasing.
There are other costs. The defendant’s insurer must also pay for the
defense lawyer’s time in scheduling, preparing for, and attending the
mediation. A fair assessment of the costs must also include some amount
attributable to the time of the insurance claims adjuster, who must also prepare
and attend the session, and any defendant physician who attends. Similar types
of expenses are incurred on the plaintiff side, even if the plaintiff does not
actually pay his or her attorney an hourly fee.
What is a fair valuation of these expenses? It is easier to determine the
costs from the defense perspective since defense attorneys typically bill by the
hour. In order to estimate these costs, we reviewed defense attorney billing
records in sixteen cases in which a mediation was held to determine the amount
of time spent preparing for and attending the mediation. That analysis
indicated that defense attorneys spent an average of 10.1 hours in connection
with the mediation. The average is only slightly more than double the amount
41. We are aware of only one certified mediator who has a degree in both law and medicine.
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of hours actually spent in the mediation itself. This figure indicates that the
preparation is modest, consisting of one or two meetings or telephone
conversations with the insurance representative and the physician to plan
strategy, and any travel required to attend the mediation. The average amount
charged by the defense attorneys for MSC-related activities was $1,110. Our
review of insurer closed claims files indicated that the claims adjuster spent
approximately the same amount of time or more preparing for the session as
did the defense counsel, in part because some of the preparation related to
conferring with defense counsel. Assuming an internal rate of $50 per hour for
these salaried employees, the adjuster’s time represents an additional cost of
about $500. Similarly, for the defendant’s physician, assuming $100 per hour (a
conservative assessment) for the average time of the mediation plus an hour
travel time, one can assume approximately $650 in additional costs. Summing
these three amounts, each separately represented defendant incurs
approximately $2,260 in added expense for the mediation in addition to the
direct charge for the mediator’s services. In general, the amount of time
expended by plaintiff’s counsel is comparable, and indeed, may even exceed
that of the defense, as plaintiffs’ attorneys often prepare a more extended
presentation of their theory of the case. Thus, for a simple case with a single
defendant, an average total charge for all costs fairly attributable to the process
(assuming the attendance of all required parties) averages about $5,000.
In the context of malpractice litigation, how does one assess this level of
expense? Is it a mere “drop in the bucket,” or is it in fact a major expense that
requires some justification? Although this figure has probably increased in the
past several years, a study of malpractice cases in North Carolina from the late
1980s indicated that the average total defense costs paid in a typical trial case
was about $35,000.42 Compared with this benchmark, forcing the parties to
mediate in an effort to avoid trial constitutes an “extra” expenditure on the
magnitude of between five and ten percent. While reasonable minds can differ
on how to interpret the magnitude of this marginal expense, our own view is
that it is neither a draconian assessment nor an insignificant amount. If it were
to be shown that mediation was typically unproductive, courts should not
lightly force the parties to bear this expense without some indication of
substantial benefit in most cases.
V
COURT-ORDERED MEDIATION AS A CASE MANAGEMENT TOOL
Proponents of mediation hoped it would provide an early intervention to
help focus settlement discussions, and otherwise assist in the prompt resolution
of a significant percentage of referred cases. This section reports our findings
on whether this hope is being realized.

42. See Metzloff, supra note 31, at 55.
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A. The Timing of the Mediation
An essential element to achieving the full measure of mediation’s promise
is conducting the mediations at a relatively early stage in the litigation process.
As noted above, the North Carolina rules did not explicitly establish any timing
target. The rules provide ambiguous guidance: on the one hand, one of the
rules notes that the order may be issued “as soon as practicable after the time
for filing of answers has expired,”43 while, on the other hand, a different rule
notes that the conference itself should be held “after an opportunity to conduct
discovery.”44 The hope was to conduct the sessions well before the traditional
“court house step” settlements on the eve of trial. The earlier these sessions
could be meaningfully held, the more potential savings to the litigants and
courts. Local practices among the various judicial districts varies.
TABLE 3
TIMING OF MEDIATION RELATIVE TO FILING DATE
(N= 164)
Filing To Mediation
Less Than Six Months
Six To Nine Months

# Of Cases

Percentage

5

3.0%

36

22.0%

Nine Months To One Year

50

30.5%

One Year To Fifteen Months

28

17.1%

Fifteen To Eighteen Months

16

9.8%

Eighteen Months To Two Years

13

7.9%

More Than 2 Years After Filing

16

9.8%

MEDIAN: 353 DAYS
MEAN: 431 DAYS

At least in the malpractice context, it does not appear that this benefit has
been fully realized. Indeed, the trend is toward greater delay in conducting the
mediation sessions. Table 3 indicates that, on average, the mediations were not
held until more than a year after the case was filed.45
43. N.C. R. IMPLEMENTING MEDIATED SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES IN SUPER. CT. ACTIONS
Rule 1.
44. Id. Rule 3.
45. This figure may be somewhat inflated due to the skewing effect associated with the start-up of
the MSC program in a particular judicial district. Each district had the authority to order already filed
cases to mediation, but some districts opted not to apply it retroactively and instead used it only for
newly filed cases. In those districts in which it was applied retroactively, it was often used for
malpractice cases that had been pending for two years or more. Thus, some of the late mediations
relative to the filing date are a function of administrative discretion and do not indicate any inherent
delay in the operation of the program. By the same token, Table 3 reports only on cases in which the
ordered mediation has in fact been held. There remain eighteen pending cases ordered to mediation
in which the required mediation has not yet been conducted, many of which were ordered to mediation
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Another means of evaluating how promptly mediations are held is to
compare the date of mediation with the date upon which mediation was
ordered by the court. Table 4 shows that on average, the mediation was held
five months after the initial court order. This indicates that delays are in fact
common. Courts typically establish a completion date for the mediation
approximately three to four months after the date of the order. As shown in
Table 4, however, slightly less than half of the malpractice mediations are
completed within this expected time frame. Indeed, about ten percent of the
cases are not mediated until more than ten months after the MSC order. The
presence of such a large cohort of cases that are not mediated promptly after
the court order reveals that the courts are fairly tolerant of the parties’ requests
for extensions of MSC deadlines.
TABLE 4
TIMING OF MEDIATION RELATIVE TO DATE ORDERED TO MEDIATION
(N= 159)
Period Of Time From
Date Of Msc Order To
Date Mediation Held

# Of Cases

Percent

Within 60 Days

16

10.1%

61 To 120 Days

56

35.2%

121 To 180 Days

42

26.4%

181 To 240 Days

13

8.2%

241 Days To 300 Days

14

8.8%

301 Days To 365 Days

10

6.3%

8

5.0%

More Than 1 Year After MSC Order
MEAN: 161 DAYS
MEDIAN: 134 DAYS

More disturbing is the trend toward greater delay in promptly completing
the MSC revealed by the court data. This trend is clearly shown in Table 5,
which denotes the average number of days from the date of the court order
sending the case to mediation, to the date of the actual mediation separated by
year of filing. For cases filed in 1991 and 1992 (which typically were the first
wave of cases ordered to mediation at the initiation of the program), the
mediations were held on average within about three months of the court order.
Requests for extensions were only infrequently made; less than one in five
cases generated an extension request. Over time, extension requests have risen

well over a year ago. Once mediated, these cases would further increase the mean and median
reported in Table 3.
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dramatically, and, with them, significant delays in conducting the mediations.
In the cases we reviewed, extension requests were routinely granted by courts;
court data reveals only a handful of extension requests that were refused. For
cases filed in 1995 (the last set of cases in our study), extension requests were
commonplace, with more than forty-five percent of the cases receiving
extensions.46 Indeed, this percentage is understated, in that in one district,
mediations are scheduled to occur within a month or two of the trial after the
close of discovery; extension requests in that judicial district are infrequent
because of the upcoming trial. Overall, for 1995 cases, the average mediation
was not held until 196 days after the court order was filed, a seventy-three
percent increase over the average figure for 1991 and 1992 cases.47 This trend
represents a clear manifestation of how, over time, attorneys and parties can
undercut the initial program goals of a court-ordered ADR program.48 At least
for malpractice, the hope that court-ordered mediation can serve as an early
ADR intervention to promote settlement has not been realized. In the large
majority of cases, the court-ordered mediation is being held only after the bulk
of discovery has been completed, often after the parties have obtained
extensions on the court-imposed deadline for completing the mediation.

46. The most common reason for seeking an extension is the perceived need by one or more
parties to conduct additional discovery, particularly depositions of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses.
Other reasons include scheduling problems with the lawyer’s trial schedule. In some cases, extensions
were requested because the mediator was too busy to conduct the session by the court-designated
deadline. While there are well over 600 certified mediators, there is a much smaller cohort of
mediators who are regularly sought after for malpractice cases. Twelve mediators handled more than
60% of the mediations in our study.
47. In fact, the extent of the growing delay is probably understated in Table 5 because it does not
include those cases ordered to mediation that at the current time have not yet been mediated. Many
of these cases were ordered to mediation well over a year ago and the mediation still has not occurred.
48. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of
Innovation Co-opted or “The Law of ADR,” 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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TABLE 5
CHANGES IN LENGTH OF TIME BETWEEN THE DATE A CASE
WAS ORDERED TO MEDIATION AND WHEN MEDIATION OCCURRED
(N=158)
Year Case Filed

# Of Cases

Median

Mean

% Request

(Days)

(Days)

Extension

Cases Filed In 1991 Or
Earlier

15

87

87

13.3%

Cases Filed In 1992

25

116

130

20.0%

Cases Filed In 1993

32

115

146

50.0%

Cases Filed In 1994

42

164

179

50.0%

44

167

196

45.5%

158

135

161

42.2%

Cases Filed In 1995
All Cases

NOTE: This table includes all malpractice cases in which information was available on when the
case was ordered to mediation compared to the date the mediation was held.

Forcing mediation too early in the litigation was a concern expressed
repeatedly by defense attorneys in response to our survey. In response to an
open-ended survey question about what should be done to improve mediation,
twelve defense counsel expressly noted that malpractice mediations should be
held later in the case. It was conventional wisdom among defense attorneys,
often accepted as true by plaintiffs’ counsel, that the mediation should not be
held until essentially all discovery, particular the depositions of the plaintiff’s
experts, was completed.49 To the extent that one of the problems ADR is
intended to solve is the high cost of litigation, permitting mediation to occur
only after the completion of expensive expert discovery is counter-intuitive. It
is also unclear why discovery is needed to explore settlements; malpractice
insurers have in all cases carefully reviewed the medical records and submitted
the case to expert consultants for review. One possible explanation for
preferring a greater delay is that defense attorneys may have a financial
interest in delaying the mediation until after most of the discovery is
completed. Another explanation is the perceived desirability in some cases for
conducting the deposition of the plaintiff’s expert in order to assess how well
the expert is capable of presenting the liability issue. Exploring settlement
value in some cases appears to be as much a function of how well the plaintiff’s
attorney and experts can present the case as it is an objective assessment of the
49. The following comment is typical of defense attorneys who noted an express concern with
timing:
You need to do the mediation later on rather than earlier. If you do it too early (within the
first six months), all you’re going to get is posturing unless it is an open and shut case. If it is
a damages only case, you can mediate it whenever. Automatic calendaring by courts is
always early—no one is ready to do it.
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merits of the case.
B. The Disposition of Mediated Cases
An obviously important factor in assessing mandatory mediation is
understanding how court-ordered mediation affects the resolution profile of
cases. Table 6 presents a flow chart of cases in which mediations were held.
The results are somewhat obscured by the fact that some cases are still pending.
TABLE 6
DISPOSITION RESULTS IN MEDIATED MALPRACTICE CASES
(N = 202)
Cases In Which Mediation Held

202 Cases (100%)

Dispositions In Mediated Cases
1. Agreement Or Partial Agreement At MSC
2. Impasse Reported At MSC
Subsequent Disposition Of Impassed Mediations
1. Trial Commenced After Impasse At MSC
2. No Trials Commenced After Impasse At MSC
Resolution Of Impassed MSC Cases Not Tried

50 (24.8%)
152 (75.2%)
152 Cases (100%)
45 (29.6%)
107 (70.4%)
107 Cases (100%)

1. Dismissed By Court On Summary Judgment
Or Motion To Dismiss

6 (5.6%)

2. Case Was Subsequently Settled With Plaintiff
Receiving A Monetary Payment

68 (63.6%)

3. Case Was Dropped By Plaintiff

23 (21.5%)

4. Case Is Still Pending

10 (9.3%)

NOTE: For subsequent dispositions, it is assumed that a case with a voluntary dismissal with
prejudice represents a settlement unless other information is available (such as from insurance company
reviews or direct information from attorneys) that no compensation was paid. It is also assumed that a
voluntary dismissal without prejudice indicates that the case was dropped and that there was no payment.

1. The Non-Mediated Cases: Exemptions and the Scheduling Effect. An
initial fact worth noting is that a large number of cases ordered to mediation
are never mediated. The exact numbers of non-mediated cases cannot be
accurately determined at this point because some of the cases are still pending
(and, as a result, a mediation may still be held), and also because additional
follow-up is still needed on cases in which it is unclear from the court record
whether a mediation was held. Nonetheless, it is clear that about one-third of
the cases ordered to mediation were not, in fact, mediated. What is the
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significance of such a high percentage of cases in which no mediation occurred
despite the court’s order?
One possible explanation may be that courts are exempting cases from
mediation at the parties’ request. In fact, however, exemptions account for
only a small number of the non-mediated cases: only six cases were granted
exemptions, representing less than two percent of the total cases ordered to
mediation.50 With the exception of one judicial district, North Carolina courts
were generally unwilling to grant exemptions. In Forsyth County (which had
the most cases in our study), the judge responsible for administering the
program considered a request to exempt a case from mediation early in the
MSC program’s history. In their motion to exempt, the parties asserted that
there was “no chance” that the case would be voluntarily resolved.51 Given the
experimental nature of the program, the judge denied the request. The case
subsequently settled at the mediation, and, based upon this experience, no
exemption requests have been granted since that time in that district. Not
surprisingly, few requests for exemption were made once it became generally
known such requests would not be granted. It remains unclear if in fact few
parties wish to be exempted or, rather, the attorneys believe that courts are
generally unwilling to grant exemption requests and therefore do not bother to
make the request.52
If judicial exemptions are only rarely granted, what then accounts for the
large number of non-mediated cases? The bulk of cases that were not
mediated consisted almost equally of cases that were dismissed without
prejudice, usually indicating that the plaintiff was dropping the case, or
dismissed with prejudice, usually indicating receipt of a monetary payment.
Together, a total of eighty-two cases, representing almost one-quarter of the
total cases ordered to mediation, were dismissed by the parties prior to the
mediation being held. An interesting issue is whether the mediation program is
directly responsible for these resolutions. If a large number of these dismissals
were in fact directly caused by the court’s mediation order, it would be strong
evidence of a substantial “scheduling effect,” in which the mere fact of the
court’s ADR order served as a catalyst for the parties to resolve the case
without a direct mediator or court intervention.
Undoubtedly, some of these resolutions were directly triggered by the court
ordering the mediation. There were several cases in which the mediator filed a
report indicating that he or she was called the day before a scheduled
50. A few additional cases were granted exemptions in situations where a case was mediated, then
dismissed without prejudice and subsequently refiled. In that situation, courts were more willing to
exempt the refiled case from the mediation requirement given that the parties had previously
mediated. See, e.g., Nesnow v. Morris, 93-CVS-0477, refiled as 95-CVS-0823 (Orange County).
51. Patterson v. Wake Forest, 91-CVS-3777 (Forsyth County).
52. In those cases that were exempted, the results indicated that the parties’ judgment that
mediation would not be useful was appropriate. In two cases, the matter ultimately went to trial. Two
cases were dismissed by the court, one for the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute, the second on
defendant’s motion for summary judgment. In one case, plaintiff dismissed the case without prejudice,
and did not refile it. The last case was still pending long after the case was exempted from the MSC.

METZLOFF.FMT

134

04/01/98 8:08 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 60: No. 1

mediation and told that either the case had been settled or the plaintiff was
dismissing the case so that there was no need to conduct the mediation. Others
were just as certainly not related. Several dismissals occurred at almost the
same time as the court order was mailed by the court to the parties; it is hard to
believe that the mere receipt of an order to mediate at some point within the
next few months would trigger an immediate decision to settle or drop the case.
Moreover, in several of these cases, a discovery motion or summary judgment
motion was pending which also could have served as a catalyst for a dismissal.
In the absence of a control group,53 it is not possible to quantify further any
scheduling impact, other than to acknowledge that our results are consistent
with a possibly meaningful scheduling effect.
2. The Resolution Process in Mediated Cases. Of more importance is what
happened to those cases that were in fact mediated. Is court-ordered
mediation, as examined in our study, a successful approach for resolving
medical malpractice cases? This is not an easy question to answer, largely
because of the difficulty of defining success. If success is limited to situations in
which the case is resolved at the mediation session itself (either through
settlement or the plaintiff agreeing to drop the case), then mediation is not a
particularly successful strategy for malpractice cases. As set forth below in
Table 6, of the 202 cases that were actually mediated, only fifty cases were fully
or partially resolved54 at the conference itself. This agreement rate is lower
than the rate found by other empirical researchers evaluating the impact of the
MSC program on all types of cases.55
In the remaining 152 cases, the mediator reported that the MSC ended in an
impasse. Forty-five of the cases were subsequently tried,56 and thirty-six
proceeded to verdict as against at least one defendant.57 Defendants prevailed
in thirty cases (83.3%). Plaintiffs prevailed in only six of the cases (although
53. We expect to incorporate a control group into this study at a later point in the project.
Information related to court dispositions is currently being collected for malpractice cases in judicial
districts that did not have the authority to require mediations that are physically adjacent to districts
that were involved in the MSC program.
54. Six of the cases reflected partial agreement at the MSC. These were usually cases in which a
settlement was reached as to one defendant, such as a hospital, but in which the mediation was
impassed with respect to another defendant, typically a doctor. To give the program the full benefit,
partial agreements are combined with complete agreements.
55. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 14, at 70 (indicating that 76 of 171 mediations (44.4%) resulted in
agreement at the mediation).
56. This figure includes any case in which a trial was commenced. Trial itself is not a resolution of
a case, but rather a process that ultimately may lead to a resolution. Cases that are in trial may have a
number of different outcomes. The case may be dismissed by the plaintiff prior to verdict or settled by
the parties during trial. The judge may grant summary judgment or a motion for a directed verdict
during trial. The trial may result in a hung jury, necessitating further court activity. Even if the case
results in a verdict, the parties may still settle without a judgment being entered by the court.
57. In the nine cases that did not proceed to verdict, three cases were dropped by the plaintiff
during the middle of the trial. Two cases were settled during the trial, one during jury voir dire and
one after two weeks of trial. The Court granted summary judgment to the defendant in one case and
directed a verdict in another. One case resulted in a hung jury and was settled prior to retrial. In one
case, the result is unknown and the court file was sealed.
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others were settled during trial), in amounts ranging from $15,000 to $2.97
million. This low success rate is consistent with earlier studies of jury verdicts
in the North Carolina courts.58 What is significant is the high rate of trials
despite the mediation. The trial rate associated with all cases ordered to
mediation was about fifteen percent; the trial rate associated with cases which
in fact went to mediation was 22.3%. Indeed, these trial rates may be slightly
understated, given that several cases remain pending, some of which will almost
certainly be tried. An earlier study of North Carolina malpractice cases, which
serves as a useful comparison group for this purpose, indicated an overall trial
rate of 13.2%.59 This comparison clearly indicates that the mediation program
has not in fact lowered the trial rate among malpractice cases. Assuming that
one of the goals of this program was to reduce the trial rate among malpractice
cases, it has not been realized.
Of the 107 non-trial cases that reached an impasse through mediation, ten
cases are still pending. The remainder of the cases were resolved as follows:
six were resolved by the court granting summary judgment or pursuant to
motions to dismiss; sixty-eight were settled as evidenced either by a court order
approving a settlement (required in the case of minors or some guardianship
situations) or a voluntary dismissal with prejudice in which it is assumed that
plaintiff received a monetary settlement;60 and twenty-three were dropped by
the plaintiff without any monetary payment, usually evidenced in court by the
filing of a voluntary dismissal without prejudice.61
Proponents of the program argue that any appropriate measure of the
program’s true success must take into account not only those cases that were
settled at the mediation itself but also those cases that were settled or otherwise
resolved following an impasse as a direct result of discussions begun at the
mediation. The point of the mediation is not just to settle cases that day; it is to
“start the ball rolling” toward a final resolution. This point raises a difficult
empirical issue—how can researchers be sure that the mediation in fact played
a meaningful role in the ultimate resolution of cases resolved after an impasse
was declared? Proponents tend to credit any post-mediation resolution short
of trial as having been caused by the mediation. Such an assumption is by no
58. See, e.g., Metzloff, supra note 31 at 50 (reporting a plaintiff’s success rate for cases proceeding
to verdict of 18.8%).
59. See id. at 49.
60. In many instances, we have been able to confirm whether a monetary payment was made in
cases terminated as a result of a voluntary dismissal with prejudice. Confirmations were obtained in
numerous cases from our review of insurers’ closed claims files. In addition, we have obtained such
information confirming resolutions directly from attorneys involved in 38 cases.
61. It is not possible in all cases to determine from the court records whether a voluntarily
dismissal without prejudice indicates a final resolution of the case. Under North Carolina law, a
plaintiff may refile a case that has been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice within one year. In
each case, we checked court records to determine if the case had been refiled, but in some instances
the one year grace period for refiling had not expired. In some cases, our review of insurance files
provided definitive information. In any event, if a case was refiled, it is clear that the mediation did
not play a significant role in its resolution, as the final resolution would then be a year or more after
the mediation was initially held.
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means accurate; it may well be that settlement was caused by intervening
events, such as the filing of a motion for summary judgment or an impending
trial. Mediator claims to success also must be evaluated carefully. First,
mediators are not privy to information on ultimate dispositions, and any claim
that the session was “useful” is obviously self-serving. After a mediation
reaches an impasse, mediators typically are no longer involved in the case and
are unaware of further court activities. Moreover, mediators have a strong
financial self-interest to claim credit for the process working successfully. In
short, researchers must develop some defensible alternative methods for
determining when the mediation is a “proximate cause” of the subsequent
resolution in order to evaluate fully the mediation program.
Given the wealth of our data, we were able to analyze the result in all cases
reaching an impasse and make a determination as to whether the mediation
process should be credited as a “success” in assisting in the resolution.62 This
judgment, based upon a set of working assumptions set forth below, permits us
to determine an overall “success rate” for court-ordered mediation in the
malpractice context. Table 7 sets out our overall findings.

62. We use the term “success” with some hesitancy. It may well be that a case that settles at
mediation—and is thus labeled successful—would have in fact settled at about the same time without
the mediation. Similarly, the fact that a mediation is deemed “unsuccessful” under our assumptions
does not mean that the mediation was worthless. The parties may have had a productive session and
made significant progress toward a settlement, but then not been able to bridge the final gap prior to
starting trial. The point is that trying to determine whether a mediation session is helpful to the parties
is inherently subjective, and views on this topic may vary among the participants. Our goal is to use a
more systematic measure of whether the outcome of the mediation is consistent with its policy goals.
Thus, if the case ultimately went to trial following mediation, the mediation was not successful in terms
of its defined objective of assisting parties in resolving disputes short of trial. Again, this label does
not imply that use of mediation in such a case was unhelpful, worthless, or otherwise inappropriate.
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TABLE 7
DETERMINING THE SUCCESS OF MALPRACTICE MEDIATION
(N = 197)
I. “Successful” Mediations
1. Agreement Or Partial Agreement At Msc

50

(25.4%)

2. Cases Settled After Msc And Related

35

(17.8%)

3. Cases Dropped After Msc And Related

2

(1.0%)

87

(44.2%)

45

(22.8%)

6

( 3.0%)

3. Case Settled And Unrelated To Msc

33

(16.8%)

4. Dropped By Plaintiff And Unrelated

21

(10.7%)

TOTAL:
II. “Unsuccessful” Mediation
1. Cases That Went To Trial After Msc
2. Dismissed By Court After Msc

5. Still Pending At Least 6 Months After Msc
TOTAL:

5

(2.5%)

110

(55.8%)

NOTE: This table excludes all cases in which an MSC resulted in an impasse and the case is still
pending, unless the case was still pending more than six months after the MSC, at which time it has been
considered to be “unsuccessful.”

Certain resolutions are easily credited to the mediation process. If a case
was resolved at the MSC or a partial agreement was reached, the case is
counted in the “success” column. If a case went to trial (regardless of the
outcome at the trial), the case is placed in the “unsuccessful” column. Trial
indicates that the parties were unable to reach a common understanding of the
value of the case, and that the mediation had failed to bridge that gap.
Similarly, cases resolved by the court on a motion for summary judgment or a
motion to dismiss after a mediation reached an impasse were assigned to the
“unsuccessful” column.
The more difficult task is determining if the mediation was in fact a
proximate cause of cases that were settled or dropped before trial. In those
cases in which we examined the insurer’s closed claim file, we were able to
directly assess whether the mediation was related to the subsequent resolution.
In other cases, we analyzed certain variables in making the determination.
The most important variable was the amount of time that elapsed from the
date of the conclusion of the mediation until the final resolution of the case.
For example, if the case were settled within a few weeks of the mediation, it is
certainly a fair assumption to credit the mediation with being a direct cause of
the settlement. If, however, the case were not settled until a year later
(perhaps within a week or two of a scheduled trial), any direct link between the
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mediation and the settlement would be highly tenuous.63 Table 8 shows the
time to disposition following impasse in 87 mediated cases that were reported
as reaching an impasse but were subsequently resolved. Significantly, only
about half of the cases reaching an impasse were resolved within six months of
the mediation. Our working assumption is that resolutions that occurred
within six months of the mediation were related to the MSC while those
occurring more than six months after the mediation were not related, absent
strong indication to the contrary.
TABLE 8
TIME TO TERMINATION AFTER IMPASSE
( N = 87)
Time To Disposition
Subsequent To Msc
Within 60 Days Of Msc

# Of Cases

Percent

10

11.5%

Within 61 To 120 Days Of Msc

17

19.5%

Within 121 To 180 Days Of Msc

15

17.2%

Within 181 To 240 Days Of Msc

15

17.2%

More Than 240 Days After Msc

30

34.5%

NOTE: This table examines all cases in which a mediation was held, an impasse was declared, and
the case was subsequently terminated.

Another variable is the presence of any post-mediation intervening events,
such as the filing of motions, additional discovery, or further factual
developments. The more court activity that occurred following the impasse,
the more likely it is that subsequent events played a direct role in the ultimate
outcome. Another important variable is how the time of resolution compares
to the scheduled trial date. Many court files contained an order establishing a
set date for the trial of the case. If the resolution occurred within a few days of
the scheduled trial, it was more likely to have been a traditional “on the
courthouse steps” resolution than one related to the mediation. Another
variable relates to the mediation itself. The longer the mediation, the greater
likelihood that the negotiations begun at the session played a role in the
63. An example will help illustrate the type of case-by-case review that we performed to generate
Table 7. In one case, the parties had each made a settlement offer prior to the mediation and were
about $15,000 apart in a relatively minor malpractice case. Following the mediation (in which the
plaintiffs increased their demand and the defendants in fact refused to offer the amount previously
offered), the parties did not negotiate further. Some additional discovery was performed.
Immediately prior to the scheduled trial, the plaintiff filed for a dismissal without prejudice and
dismissed their attorney. Prior to refiling, the plaintiff accepted the defendant’s slightly increased
offer. The case was terminated 10 months after the mediation, which had lasted only two hours. In
this case, given the time lag, the lack of progress at the mediation, and the additional court activity, we
considered this settlement as an “unrelated” one, thereby rating this MSC as “unsuccessful.”
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subsequent resolution.
In each of the cases settled or dropped after impasse without a trial being
commenced, we analyzed the variables described above to determine whether
the result should be credited as a success for the mediation process. This
evaluation resulted in roughly half of the post-mediation settlements being
deemed related (and therefore a success for the mediation process) and the
other half being deemed unrelated. For cases that were dropped, only a small
percentage were deemed related. Most of the dismissals occurred well after the
mediation, usually on the eve of a scheduled trial.
Table 7 reports our overall findings and indicates a success rate for
mediation of about forty-four percent, consisting primarily of cases resolved at
the mediation and settlements that were found to be related to the mediation.
In fifty-six percent of the cases, the mediation was found to be unsuccessful,
consisting of those cases that went to trial, were dismissed by the court, and
those other resolutions found to be unrelated according to the above criteria.
Significantly, this overall assessment of success is closely matched by the
results of our direct observation of the forty-two malpractice mediations that
we attended. In six cases (fourteen percent) the matter was resolved at the
mediation. In another thirteen cases (thirty-one percent), it appeared to us
based upon our observation that “substantial progress” had been made even
though the case did not settle at the mediation itself. Our determination of
substantial progress was a function of whether multiple settlement offers were
made, as well as such factors as the length of the session and whether the
parties reported an interest in further negotiations. This resulted in a
combined “success rate” in the cases actually observed of forty-five percent,
almost identical to the overall success rate as determined above. In the
majority of cases, however, (twenty-three of forty-two cases, or fifty-five
percent), we observed that no significant progress was made. The closed claims
insurance files confirmed this judgment in several of these cases. Most cases
involved situations in which the defendants were disinclined to make a
settlement offer of any kind. Nothing that occurred during mediation altered
this view. Either the plaintiff eventually dropped the case, or it proceeded to
trial.
VI
MEDIATION AND MALPRACTICE: SPECIAL ISSUES OF CONCERN
The above findings provide information relevant to assessing a number of
important policy issues relating to the use of court-ordered mediation and,
more generally, its use in the medical malpractice context.
A. Judicial Administration of Mediation: Should All Malpractice Cases Be
Routinely Ordered to Mediation?
The North Carolina MSC program does not require courts to refer all cases
to mediation; it provides courts with the discretion to do so. In the majority of
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judicial districts studied, the courts routinely ordered all cases to mediation and
did not screen or otherwise try to determine which cases were better suited to
the process. Similarly, most districts did not encourage parties to seek
exemptions on a case-by-case basis. In light of our findings that the mediation
is “successful” (as defined above) in less than half of malpractice cases, should
courts screen cases to avoid forcing parties to conduct mediation sessions that
may accomplish little?64
Three questions in our survey of lawyers addressed this key issue. First, we
asked the attorneys whether malpractice cases were more, less, or just as likely
to settle at mediation in comparison with other types of cases. Second, we
asked the lawyers whether they thought the use of MSCs in medical
malpractice cases was more, less, or just as appropriate as in other cases. Third,
and most directly, we asked the attorneys whether malpractice cases should be
“routinely referred” to mediation. Table 9 sets forth the results.

64. One immediate objection to screening is that it would require additional court time and effort.
At least in North Carolina, this objection is not compelling. Under existing procedural rules, the court
is required to conduct a discovery conference in malpractice cases early in the litigation. N.C.R. CIV.
P. 26(f)(1). What is surprising is that the issue of whether to conduct a mediation or even when to
conduct it is almost never explicitly raised in this mandatory discovery conference. Formal “discovery
scheduling orders” are routinely filed in the cases we reviewed. These orders establish specific time
limits relating to the designation of experts and place overall limits on discovery. These orders
infrequently mentioned mediation. It would be a simple task to include mediation among the topics to
be discussed at the discovery conference.
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TABLE 9
ATTORNEY SURVEYS:
ISSUES RELATING TO REFERRAL PRACTICE IN MALPRACTICE CASES
N = 117 ATTORNEY RESPONDENTS; 72 PREDOMINATELY DEFENSE ATTORNEYS/
45 PREDOMINATELY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEYS
Q. Compared To Other Types Of Cases, Are Medical Malpractice Cases (1) More Likely To
Settle As A Result Of The Msc; (2) Less Likely To Settle As A Result Of The Msc; Or (3) Just As
Likely To Settle As A Result Of The Msc As Other Types Of Cases?

Less Likely To Settle

Defense

Plaintiff

Attorneys

Attorneys

33

More Likely To Settle
Just As Likely To Settle

45.8%

6

8.3%

30

41.7%

3

4.2%

No Response

20 44.4%
1

Overall
53

45.3%

2.2%

7

6.0%

21 46.7%

51

43.6%

6

5.1%

3

6.7%

Q. In Your Opinion, Generally Is The Use Of Mediated Settlement Conferences In Medical
Malpractice Cases (1) More Appropriate; (2) Less Appropriate; Or (3) Just As Appropriate As In
Other Types Of Cases?
Defense

Plaintiff

Attorneys

Attorneys

Overall

More Appropriate

11

15.3%

9

20.0%

20

17.1%

Less Appropriate

12

16.7%

7

15.6%

19

16.2%

Just As Appropriate

48

66.7%

27

60.0%

75

64.1%

1

1.4%

2

4.4%

3

2.6%

No Response

Q. Should All Malpractice Cases Routinely Be Referred To Mediation?
Defense

Plaintiff

Attorneys

Attorneys

Yes

52

72.2%

No

19
1

No Response

Overall

34

75.6%

86

73.5%

26.4%

9

20.0%

28

23.9%

1.4%

2

4.4%

3

2.6%

The results indicate that attorneys are generally optimistic about the
program and supportive of routine referral. On the question of whether all
malpractice cases should be routinely referred to mediation, a large majority,
approximately seventy-five percent, indicated that such cases should be
routinely referred. Moreover, despite our objective findings that the program
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is successful less than half the time, and that its settlement rate appears to be
much less than other types of cases, about half the lawyers think that
malpractice cases are just as likely or more likely to settle at mediation.
Similarly, a clear majority—over seventy-percent—of the attorneys believe that
the use of MSCs is just as appropriate or more appropriate for malpractice
cases as other types of cases. As reported in Table 9, about sixty-five percent
of the respondents thought that malpractice cases were just as appropriate for
referral as other types of cases. The remaining attorneys split about evenly
between those attorneys believing that mediation was more appropriate in
malpractice and those that thought it less appropriate than in other types of
cases. Together, these findings strongly suggest that attorneys in general (with
some significant dissent) are in favor of routine referral.
Why do the attorneys favor routine referral despite the low rate of success?
Many believed that mediation offered a meaningful potential for a “better
resolution” of the case, and that the costs of an unsuccessful mediation were
more than overcome by that potential. As noted by one respondent, “I believe
a less adversarial forum is ‘healthy’ for all parties in malpractice cases, and can
assist in the healing process for both plaintiff and doctor.” Part of the answer
relates to the adversarial nature of the litigation process. Without routine
referral, many lawyers believe that appropriate cases would not be referred.
The following quote from an attorney is indicative of the views of those
attorneys who prefer routine referral:
Malpractice cases take so long to try, you should take a crack at trying to resolve
them. Malpractice cases need “to be put on the anvil” because the benefits of
settlement (even if not likely) are so substantial from the court’s perspective. If it is
late enough in the game (after sufficient discovery), there is a pretty good shot at
settlement unless it is one where they just won’t pay.

The high percentage of attorneys favoring routine referral is not as strong
an endorsement of the program as it seems at first blush. Many attorneys who
indicated their support for routine referral qualified their position by noting in
their written comments that they also recognized the importance of liberal
“opt-out” provisions. As noted above, courts have been quite reticent in
granting exemptions.
Thirteen attorneys expressly supported opt-out
provisions in their open-ended written comments. The following comment is
illustrative:
If you are going to refer all cases to mediation, I wouldn’t exempt malpractice cases.
Judges should be willing to exclude cases from mediation when they get a strong
signal from attorneys they respect that it won’t do any good. I recently had a case
that was a companion case to one that had been previously tried and won by the
defendants. It was ordered to mediation and we had to spend a day on it that was a
total waste of time and money.

In addition, many attorneys who supported routine referral differentiated
between malpractice cases in which liability was contested from cases in which
liability was clear. Thus, even though they may have voted in favor of routine
referral, their written answers made clear that their opinions related primarily
to cases in which the extent of damages was the primary issue in dispute. If
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liability was strongly contested, mediation was “often a waste of time.”
Other attorneys qualified their answers by agreeing to routine referral only
at the “appropriate time,” which usually was after all or at least most of the
discovery had occurred. The survey responses repeatedly reference the
problems of trying to mediate malpractice cases too early in the litigation
process. The following comment is typical: “It must be done at a time when the
case is ready—often (plaintiffs) experts must be deposed before there is
realistic appraisal—malpractice insurers want to know if you can prove your
case.”
If courts were to use discretion in ordering malpractice cases to mediation,
what would be the basis for deciding? Are there any objective bases upon
which to screen disputes, or would courts have to rely on the judgment of the
parties regarding the value of mediation? Several possible variables suggest
themselves. These include the type of injury or area of medical practice, on the
theory that perhaps the mediation would predictably be more productive in
cases of either more serious or less serious injuries, or that claims against
certain types of physicians, for example, obstetricians, might be more
susceptible to resolution.
As part of our study, we reviewed the injury alleged in the complaint
according to a standard ranking system. Information on severity of injury was
collected on each case according to a nine-point scale commonly used in
various closed claims studies of malpractice litigation.65 An analysis of
mediation outcomes by type of injury or area of practice has not at this point in
our analysis revealed any statistically significant differences.66 It is perhaps not
surprising that severity of injury is not a good predictor of success; an earlier
study of North Carolina malpractice suits did not find any statistically
significant differences in trial rates based upon severity.67 Difficult issues of
liability or causation can arise regardless of the type of injury involved.
Similarly, the types of emotional concerns believed to be well-suited to
mediation can arise in any kind of case. Arguably, those cases involving less
serious injuries, and as a result less extensive damages, might be more
amenable to settlement, as the cost of litigation might predispose both parties
to resolve the case without trial. Nonetheless, our results do not indicate that
the likelihood of settlement at mediation is significantly different for less
serious injuries.
Numerous attorneys mentioned that mediation was especially useful in
cases in which liability was clear and the primary issue in controversy was the
amount of damages. In such cases, concerns regarding a physician’s willingness
65. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Medical Malpractice: Characteristics of Claims
Closed in 1984, at 24 (1987).
66. We are currently interviewing those attorneys with a large number of malpractice cases to
obtain their opinions about the utility of mediation in particular cases. These “case specific” surveys
will permit a more refined analysis of questions such as this one relating to referral practices. For
example, we are specifically asking the extent to which the mediation was useful in the case.
67. See Metzloff, supra note 31, at 65.
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to permit settlement at all have usually been overcome; the question is how
much money to pay in settlement, not whether settlement is justified. Our
direct observations generally support this sentiment; in the cases in which
liability was not contested, the sessions were often productive. The difficulty in
using this factor as a dividing line for referral is obtaining quality information
on whether the liability issue in the case is in fact seriously disputed. The
parties will themselves often disagree on an assessment of the issue, with the
plaintiff usually suggesting that liability is clear or at least likely, and with the
defendant giving a more negative assessment of the strength of the liability
claim. Given that the mediation itself is not well suited to a merits-based
assessment of the liability issue, it is appropriate to continue to consider how
courts could identify cases in which the parties’ assessment of liability is widely
divergent, and consider exempting such cases from the mediation requirement.
B. Should Mediators Express Their View of the Merits of the Case?
Our analysis provides some insights into the difficult question of whether
mediators should be encouraged or even allowed to offer their views on the
merits or value of cases.68 As discussed above, a sizeable minority of mediators
we observed did in fact make merits-based assessments. Moreover, our survey
results indicate that a majority of attorneys want mediators to perform an
evaluative function. As noted in Table 10, almost seventy-percent of attorney
respondents were of the opinion that mediators should express their opinions
in appropriate cases.69 However, many respondents made clear the opinions
should be provided only in private caucuses. For example, one attorney noted
that opinions were appropriate, “but only privately to each party and in
confidence; sometimes, that’s why the participants come to mediation under
68. For a useful discussion of the evaluative versus facilitative goals of court-ordered mediation,
see James J. Alfini, Evaluative Versus Facilitative Mediation: A Discussion, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 919
(1997). For a helpful conceptual framework of the differences in approach, see Leonard L. Riskin,
Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV.
NEGOTIATION L. REV. 7 (1996).
69. The following is a sampling of the comments of those attorneys in favor of mediators
expressing their views on the merits:
“The best mediators express opinions—I select mediators whose opinions I value and I want to
hear them.”
“Medical malpractice cases need the ‘nudge’ of the mediator more than other cases to have a
chance to settle. The mediator has almost always been agreed on by the parties because both sides
respect them, so offering an opinion should not upset any one.”
The following comment, while not necessarily typical, is an interesting exposition on the question:
I talked to my partner who does a lot of mediation in a widespread group of complex cases
about this and he said “Hell, that’s what everybody wants.” If you don’t indicate the range,
you won’t be successful. You’re going to have to pick a number and drive the parties to it.
As a mediator, I am focusing on the merits. I recently said to the defense, “off the record, are
you guys going to walk out of here with a zero or are some of you going to get hit?” In every
case that I’ve had in mediation that was successful, the mediator came up with the number
with whatever “label” they put on it. It is better if the mediator does this later on in the
mediation so that it appears that it is a function of “osmosis” from what’s happened. If the
parties ask me to say what I think it is worth, then I’ll do it with both sides present if they
agree. If plaintiff’s counsel asks me and if the other side agrees and you want my opinion, I’ll
give it to you. Unless both of you want my opinion, I’m not going to give it.
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the guise of so many other stated reasons.” Others thought opinions should be
given only if both sides explicitly agreed that it would be useful.
TABLE 10
ATTORNEY SURVEYS:
SHOULD MEDIATORS EXPRESS OPINIONS ON THE MERITS
(N = 117 ATTORNEY RESPONDENTS)
Q. In Your Opinion, Should A Mediator Express His Or Her Views Or Judgments About The
Merits Of The Case During The Mediation In A Medical Malpractice Case?
Defense

Plaintiff

Attorneys

Attorneys

Overall

Yes

46

63.9%

33

73.3%

79

67.5%

No

24

33.3%

11

24.4%

35

29.9%

2

2.8%

1

2.2%

3

2.6%

No Response

Since the majority of attorneys think it appropriate for mediators to express
substantive views on the merits, it follows that most attorneys would value
mediators having direct experience with malpractice litigation. In theory, if
mediators are not able to express opinions on the merits, there is little reason
for them to have substantive expertise in the area being litigated. Their role
would be to improve communication and overcome the personal obstacles to
resolution. One need not know anything about the medical issues involved in a
case to understand the nature of the plaintiff’s anger or the reputational
interests of the doctor.
We did not ask an objective question relating to this point, but we did ask
attorneys to state what traits or skills they valued most in a mediator in a
medical malpractice case. Among those attorneys who responded, substantive
expertise relating to malpractice litigation or medical knowledge was highly
valued. A total of twenty-six of seventy-five attorneys (34.7%) mentioned
medical malpractice or medical expertise as a desirable trait.70 Medical or
malpractice expertise was listed more often than other traits such as
perseverance, objectivity, fairness, or general litigation experience. Table 11
provides an illustration of comments received from attorneys relating to
substantive expertise.

70. Numerous other comments arguably related to experience but were not counted because they
focused more generally on mediators having experience in “complex litigation” or experience with
personal injury suits. For example, one attorney simply listed “experience” as a desired trait. This was
not counted as it did not explicitly list malpractice experience or knowledge of medicine.
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TABLE 11
ILLUSTRATION OF COMMENTS RELATING TO DESIRED SKILLS
AND TRAITS IN MEDIATORS
The Following Written Comments Were Provided In Response To The Question “What
Qualities Are Most Important To You In A Mediator For A Medical Malpractice Case?”
“Prior experience trying medical malpractice cases.”
“Exposure to like cases; comprehension of difficulties in proof/evidence and medical
standards and damages.”
“Sufficient experience to understand medical evidence and issues.”
“Experience with medical malpractice cases.”
“Knowledge of the medicine involved.”
“Former judge, senior attorney who has handled or heard a number of medical malpractice
cases.”
“Someone who has experience with malpractice cases either as a lawyer or judge.”
“Some experience in trial of negligence cases is essential—some experience in trial of
medical cases is helpful.”
“Sufficient intelligence to understand the medical as well as the legal issues.”
“Knowledge of medicine and law applicable to medical malpractice cases.”
“Experience with medical cases as a judge or practicing attorney. Mediators who know
these cases through mediation only are less helpful.”
“The quality of being able to grasp the precise medical issues that are being disputed.”
“Ability to understand the medical issues and speak intelligently about them with the
doctor; ability to listen to both sides, synthesize the information and point out weaknesses from
an ‘objective’ standpoint; ability to kindly but firmly ask the hard questions that a jury will ask.”

For those opposed to mediators giving their opinion, a major theme
sounded was the legitimacy of the basis for their opinion. Some noted that
without any assurances that the mediators were experienced in malpractice
matters, their opinions may not be reliable. Others noted that given the nature
of the mediation process, the mediator usually “does not know enough [about]
the facts to be helpful.” Others pointed out the possible negative impact of a
mediator expressing an opinion; the party that is the beneficiary of the
mediator’s assessment can become inflexible and further progress may be
thereby impeded.
The implications of the attorney’s interest in medical or malpractice
expertise is potentially significant. In some counties, courts are responsible for
appointing the mediators because the parties frequently fail to agree on a
mediator. These courts should be more deliberate in appointing mediators
with relevant expertise for malpractice mediations. Another implication is that
mediators and the parties should be more interested in pre-mediation
preparation. At this point, few mediators are provided any information on the
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case before the mediation. If at least some forms of evaluation are desired,
preparation may well be necessary. A serious concern is the disjunction that
our research reveals between the theory of mediation as a facilitative process
(as exhibited in the ethics rules prohibiting direct evaluation), and the desire of
attorneys and the actual practice of some mediators.
C. Understanding the Settlement Process in Malpractice Cases: The Role of
the National Practitioner Data Bank.
One of the most interesting issues involved in our study relates to the
impact of the National Practitioner Data Bank (“Data Bank”) on the
settlement dynamic in medical malpractice cases. The Data Bank was first put
into operation in September 1990 by the federal government to collect
information about malpractice payments paid by, and disciplinary actions taken
against, individual physicians.71 Its basic purpose was to provide a central
repository of information so that hospitals and other permitted users could
query the Data Bank to obtain accurate information about physicians for
purposes such as credentialling. The proponents of the Data Bank apparently
did not anticipate that the reporting requirement might have a negative impact
on the settlement process in malpractice cases. Nonetheless, a number of
mediators and attorneys in our study suggested that physicians who were upset
by the thought of being reported to the Data Bank, and concerned with the
consequences of such reporting, might refuse to permit settlement of even
malpractice disputes in which liability was probable and the plaintiff was willing
to be reasonable respecting the amount of damages. The potential importance
of this negative impact is highlighted by the fact that many malpractice
insurers—currently including all the major insurers in North Carolina—afford
insured physicians the right to veto any settlement. 72
Identifying any adverse impact the Data Bank reporting requirement may
have is likely to be difficult. In cases of clear liability, even the negative impact
of the Data Bank probably will not overcome the logic of settlement. Also, the
Data Bank is not likely to have anything but a marginal impact on the decision
to avoid settlement in cases where the physician and the insurer perceive there
is no liability. Most malpractice insurers have a “no nuisance value” settlement
policy; as is clear from the generally high trial rates in malpractice cases,
malpractice insurers are willing to litigate. Accordingly, any observable impact
of the Data Bank will be largely concentrated on those cases in which liability
is questionable. Because of our direct observation of the malpractice
settlement process through the prism of court-ordered mediation, we were able
to assess more directly the extent to which the Data Bank creates a significant
71. For a useful description of the origins and purpose of the National Practitioner’s Data Bank,
see Ilene D. Johnson, Reports to the National Practitioner Data Bank, 265 JAMA 407 (1991). For early
assessment of its operations, see Fitzhugh Mullan et al., The National Practitioner Data Bank—Report
from the First Year, 268 JAMA 73 (1992).
72. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations
and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 361 (1991).
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obstacle in settlement negotiations.
Evidence from our study reveals that the Data Bank’s reporting
requirement is in fact a major issue in many malpractice cases. The Data Bank
was a significant issue in twenty-five percent of the cases in which a defendant
doctor subject to the reporting requirement was involved (eight of thirty-two
cases).73 In fact, this percentage significantly understates the importance of the
Data Bank issue. In several of the cases, liability was clear, and, predictably,
the Data Bank was not a concern. In nearly fifty percent of the cases in which
liability was an issue, the Data Bank was expressly referenced (eight of
seventeen cases). In each of these cases, the affected doctor discussed the Data
Bank as a major issue in the settlement of the case. Often, the doctor spoke
personally to the mediator about the impact of the Data Bank.
Simply because a point is raised in a mediation does not necessarily mean it
is a serious issue. Indeed, there would appear to be little reason for a physician
not to raise an objection to settlement based upon the Data Bank. It provides a
principled basis for opposing a settlement, and indicates that the physician has
a strong reason to contest liability, perhaps in hopes that the plaintiff will lower
the settlement demand. There are other indications from our study, however,
that physician concern with the Data Bank was genuine. In our survey of
attorneys, we asked whether the Data Bank constituted an obstacle to the
settlement of malpractice claims. The results indicated clearly that defense
counsel believed it to be a serious issue. As set forth in Table 12, half of all the
attorney respondents indicated that the Data Bank was “a significant issue in
most cases.” Another third indicated that it was a “significant issue in some
cases.” Overall, only twelve percent indicated that it was “rarely a significant
issue.”74

73. This excludes cases in which only a hospital was a defendant or in which the defendant doctor
was deceased.
74. Indeed, even this response overstated the position. From the written comments provided,
several of the attorneys in this group indicated that they did not believe it was a significant issue
because they were attorneys for hospitals and thus their clients did not face the reporting requirement.
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TABLE 12
ATTORNEY SURVEYS:
IMPACT OF NATIONAL PRACTITIONER’S DATA BANK
(N = 117 ATTORNEY RESPONDENTS)
Q. Based On Your Experience, To What Extent Does The Reporting Requirement Established
By The National Practitioner’s Data Bank Constitute An Obstacle To Settlement Of Medical
Malpractice Claims?
Defense Attorneys

Plaintiff Attorneys

Overall

Significant Issue In Most Cases

38

52.8%

20

44.4%

58 49.6%

Significant Issue In Some Cases

24

33.3%

12

26.7%

36 30.8%

Rarely A Significant Issue

8

11.1%

6

13.3%

14 12.0%

No Response

2

2.8%

7

15.6%

9

7.7%

The written comments respecting the Data Bank also supported the view
that the Data Bank is generally perceived by attorneys as a major obstacle to
the settlement of malpractice claims.75 Typical comments such as the Data
Bank is a “very compelling factor” (emphasis in original) and that it “creates
very serious problems” were common.76 One defense counsel wrote that being
75. One view expressed by a few defense lawyers was that the Data Bank was an issue, but that it
was a concern that they were able to address with their clients in appropriate cases. Even some of
these comments, however, noted that physician concern with the Data Bank was increasing. The
following comment makes the point well:
Most carriers have a veto by the doctor in their policy now—that’s the market. They didn’t
used to let them do that. I’ve always been able to massage a difficult defendant to accept it
by convincing them that they will have a lot of distinguished company in the Data Bank—it
won’t impact their practice. Going into the Data Bank is not a problem unless they are a
repeat offender or recidivist. You can make the Data Bank not a factor. It is getting a little
worse; doctors are more cognizant of it today. What they hate is that they have to report it
every time they apply to a hospital or a PPO and they are reminded of it. I write them a little
blurb as favorable and as benign as possible about their case that they can use.
76. The following comments are illustrative:
The impact of the National Practitioner’s Data Bank is a tremendous obstacle to settlement
in any medical malpractice cases other than those of clear liability. I have represented many
physicians in responding to inquiries from the Data Bank and from the North Carolina Board
of Medical Examiners following settlement of a lawsuit and I can confirm that the
administrative hassles occasioned by settlement are not worth it if liability is questionable.
Even before the Data Bank, over 75% of malpractice cases were tried in our experience.
Many that settled did so because, at the 11th hour, defense would offer and plaintiff was
willing to accept “nuisance” settlement to avoid/offset litigation expenses. Now, [because of
the Data Bank] those case are the most difficult ones to settle.
(Emphasis in original).
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reported to the Data Bank is “[r]egarded as a permanent black mark by the
health care provider.” The point made by several attorneys is that there is little
incentive for a physician to settle voluntarily and be reported. As long as the
case offers some reasonable chance of success on the issue of liability, a trial,
even with its attendant costs, is preferable. As one attorney noted, “[d]octors
[who do not pay the expense of trial] would rather ‘roll the dice’ re settlement
or trial since a win at trial is great, whereas a loss at trial is no worse than
reporting a settlement.”
Perhaps even more telling are the views of fourteen plaintiffs’ lawyers that
added written comments. None of the plaintiffs’ attorneys questioned the
legitimacy of the Data Bank concerns raised by physicians;77 they
acknowledged the reality of the obstacle to settlement created by the Data
Bank. As one plaintiff’s attorney put it, the Data Bank is an “[a]dditional
hurdle on a track where hurdles abound . . . . often, this is the last straw.”
Several of the written comments noted the extent of the problem. As one
plaintiff’s lawyer put it, “[m]ost physicians will do anything to avoid being
listed in the Data Bank—especially younger doctors. It has resulted in many
more problems than it has solved.” In the words of another plaintiff’s attorney,
the Data Bank is a “[b]ig stumbling block and the public is hurt because of it.”
Numerous attorneys mentioned the fact that the impact of the Data Bank
was more keenly felt by younger doctors who were more concerned with the
growing trend toward managed care. Faced with a business environment in
which alliances with various health care providers is necessary, younger doctors
were more concerned with the long-range impact of having been reported to
the Data Bank. Older physicians who did not anticipate any change in the
structure of their practice could more easily ignore the Data Bank’s impact.
Mediators also noted the obstacles to settlement created by the Data Bank.
About half of the mediator respondents reported that the Data Bank was a
“significant issue most of the time.” When asked for strategies to overcome
physician objection, the mediators had few concrete proposals. In the cases we
observed, one approach was simply to suggest to the plaintiff that they drop the
individual physician and seek to settle only with the health care provider. In
general, mediation was not particularly effective as a means to overcome the
Data Bank problem; in none of the eight cases that we observed in which the
Data Bank issue was raised as a problem did the mediation directly result in a
settlement.
VII
CONCLUSION
What conclusions can one fairly reach about the potential of court-ordered
mediation in the malpractice context as revealed by the results of the North
77. One plaintiff’s attorney noted that the Data Bank issue could on occasion be used as a
bargaining tool to put pressure on a hospital (which does not have to report to the Data Bank) to settle
in a case in which both a hospital and individual defendant were sued.
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Carolina study? One reaction is to question whether the term “mediation” is in
fact appropriately used in conjunction with this program. While some of the
potential benefits commonly associated with mediation were observed in some
cases, the program as it has evolved is usually nothing more than a structured,
traditional settlement conference conducted by a neutral third party. The
parties themselves participate only infrequently and creative solutions are
rarely considered. Lawyers talking about money is the norm. There remains
much opportunity to consider how more creative forms of mediation could be
employed in the malpractice context.
Questioning the fairness of the term mediation is not an indictment of the
utility of the program but rather a concern with whether the expectations that
may be raised by use of the term match the reality of the process. With respect
to program performance, the results are mixed. Certainly, the MSC program as
implemented in North Carolina passes the medical profession’s “Hippocratic
Oath” test—it does no harm. By starting with this observation, we do not mean
to damn the program with faint praise. It is significant that lawyers, on both
the plaintiff and defense side, are generally satisfied with the program. Some
cases are settled by means of this procedure. When they are settled, they
appear to be settled sooner than they otherwise would have been. In light of
the serious concerns raised by some critics of court-imposed ADR,
demonstrating that such programs do not decrease overall quality, or impose
burdensome expense on the parties, is important. The costs of the program,
while perhaps higher than they seem at first blush, are not extraordinary given
the overall scope and expense associated with malpractice litigation.
Yet the program is by no means a panacea for the problems associated with
managing malpractice cases. As a case management tool, the process appears
to be an effective way to handle those malpractice cases in which both parties
have a genuine desire to settle. Many cases are resolved directly as a result of
the mediation. On the other hand, for those cases in which the parties are not
inclined to settle, there is little evidence that the mediation program is able to
transform the dispute or significantly alter the parties’ understanding or
approach to the case. Only rarely is new information learned by a party in the
mediation. There are numerous cases in which the MSC exercise can fairly be
described as worthless. Mediation seldom provides the parties with important
new insights that cause them to revisit their basic understanding of the merits
of the case or its settlement value.
Based on the experience in North Carolina, courts should not conclude that
court-ordered mediation by itself is the solution. In part, our study reveals that
there are important and difficult issues related to how courts should manage
court-ordered mediation programs. The North Carolina courts have perhaps
not been as active as they should have been in managing the program
effectively. Over time, the MSC has been pushed further back in the litigation
process, limiting its potential to significantly reduce litigation expenses. Courts
have also not considered whether screening mechanisms might be developed to
use court-ordered mediation in a more effective manner. Our study indicates
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that more selective use of this process might well be justified. At a minimum,
the study suggests that courts should be more receptive to parties’ requests to
be exempted from the mediation process.

